COVER PHOTOGRAPH:

O K Corral in Tombstone, 1879.
Kindness of Mr. and Mrs. Ben Sanders.

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EDITORS:

Larry Christiansen
Howard Monnett
Richard Myers

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THE CONFEDERATE INTRUSION INTO ARIZONA TERRITORY 1862

By

RICHARD D. MYERS

-- PRELUDE --

The desire of the Confederacy to conquer the Arizona Territory in 1862 led to the formation of the Army of New Mexico under the command of Brigadier General H. H. Sibley. The goal of the confederate expedition, to be led by General Sibley into the Southwest at this time, had several factors at its base. Some were fact, while others were more fanciful. There was, first of all, the belief by some Rebels that there were many in the Arizona Territory who were pro-southern in their sympathy. These included many soldiers stationed in the western posts, certain "prominent men" of the Territory, and possibly the natives. It was even asserted that the Mormons of Utah might be willing to join the southern cause. Another inducement was the vast supplies sent to the western forts by former U. S. Secretary of War, John B. Floyd, in 1859. Undoubtedly, the most important of all factors involved would be the rich mineral resources of Arizona plus its affording an outlet to the Pacific Ocean for the Confederacy. And what if California could be conquered, and possibly northern Mexico? While this speculation was going on in the East, Lt. Colonel John R. Baylor was commanding Confederate forces at Fort Bliss, Texas, in the West. Fearing that Union forces were concentrating at Fort Fillmore, in New Mexico, to launch an attack upon Fort Bliss, Baylor decided to attack first. He quickly moved as far north as Mesilla, New Mexico. The Rebel force numbering about 258 troops, routed the Union force estimated to be over 500 men on the evening of July 25. Baylor followed the retreating troops for two days and finally caught them near San Augustine Springs. Here, the whole command, consisting of eight companies of infantry and three companies of mounted rifles, plus their four artillery pieces and all supplies was surrendered by Major Isaac Lynde to the Confederate force.

When the Union forces at Fort Stanton received word of Lynde's capture, they immediately set fire to their supplies and abandoned the Post. Most of the supplies were saved by a heavy rain that put out the fire and the civilians living near the fort. Confederate troops occupied Fort Stanton for a short while, but finally abandoned it because Colonel Baylor believed his force was too weak to be divided over such an expanse of territory. Colonel Baylor believed some form of government was quickly needed for the Confederate cause. A proclamation was issued on August 1, 1861, to the people of Arizona. In the proclamation, Baylor declared a temporary military government. He took possession of the Arizona Territory in behalf
THE ORGANIZATION OF SIBLEY'S BRIGADE

Baylor's success in New Mexico must have been encouraging to the Confederate leaders in Richmond. What the South needed, now, was a man who knew the territory and the people, to lead a military campaign north, up the Rio Grande. General Sibley had served in the area against the Navajo Indians in 1860; therefore, he was the man President Jefferson Davis picked to head the mission. Sibley was instructed to drive the Union troops from New Mexico and to confiscate all arms, supplies and materials of war. The general, if successful in New Mexico, was to establish a military government in the Territory guided by circumstances and his own judgment.

General Sibley was to leave Richmond immediately for Texas where Brigadier General Earl Van Dorn, commanding at San Antonio, and Governor Edward Clark, were to aid him in organizing two regiments of cavalry, one battery of howitzers, and such other forces deemed necessary for the campaign, from Texas troops. (6)

Once in Texas, Sibley had trouble obtaining supplies from the state. General P. O. Hebert told Sibley it was impossible to procure arms and munitions from the Gulf ports and even from Mexico. (7) Soldiers were slow in joining the brigade too. The newspapers ran adds telling volunteers to furnish themselves with a good horse, saddle, bridle, blanket; a good double barrel shotgun or rifle, and, if possible, a bowie knife or six shooter. (8)

The Brigade formed slowly in camps along the Salado River a few miles out of San Antonio. By the middle of September the number of companies grew to seventeen. (9)

Sibley had talked of taking three regiments with him from San Antonio as early as September, 1861. To aid him, Colonel McCulloch's department had been entirely stripped of every tent, stitch of clothing, and nearly all the quartermaster stores. McCulloch flatly stated that Sibley's transportation would have to be by contact with civilian outfits, or there would be none left in his military department. Five month's supplies were sent to Fort Bliss, Texas, from San Antonio on orders from Colonel McCulloch. However, the Colonel could not give the Brigade full rations of coffee or sugar due to shortages in his own stores. (10)
Meanwhile, in El Paso, Judges J. F. Crosby and S. Hart were commissioned to procure supplies from Mexico for Sibley. Crosby made arrangements to buy a quantity of corn and beans from a contractor who was sympathetic to the Confederate cause. Hart sent 40 wagons and about fifty thousand dollars to Sonora for food supplies. He had already amassed three hundred thousand pounds of flour and ten thousand pounds of corn in the town.\(^{(11)}\)

General Sibley in a letter to General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector of the Confederate States Army, on November 16, 1861, reported that his force was deficient in arms because of the reluctance of the Texas people to give up their arms. They felt they would need them to defend the Texas coast in the event of a Yankee attack. Sibley was also deficient in manpower due to the failure of the Texas military department to supply the needed troops and the competition of military calls for men to serve east of the Mississippi. By the end of November three regiments had left San Antonio for El Paso despite the handicaps.\(^{(12)}\)

Theophilus Noel, a soldier in Sibley's Brigade, reported that the men leaving San Antonio were allowed fifteen pounds of baggage per man. The troops were armed with squirrel guns, bear guns, sportsman's guns, shotguns, and guns of all sorts, including Mountain Howitzers. He also mentioned that measles was prevalent among the men on the march, and that fifteen died of the disease before reaching Fort Bliss.\(^{(13)}\)

By December Sibley and his Brigade were at Fort Bliss. Here he assumed command of all Rebel forces on the Rio Grande, at and above Fort Quitman, and all the Territory of New Mexico and Arizona. The Confederate forces were to be known as the Army of New Mexico.\(^{(14)}\)

Difficulties in procuring supplies continued to haunt Sibley. Forage for the horses was lacking at Fort Bliss; the commissary supplies were being depleted, clothing was badly needed and unobtainable,\(^{(15)}\) and two hundred horses had been stolen. To make matters worse, the Mexican people did not accept the Confederate paper money and they were opposed to the Rebel intruders.\(^{(16)}\)

On December 20, 1861, Sibley issued a proclamation to the people of New Mexico. He said that the Army of New Mexico entered the territory to take possession in the name, and for the benefit of the Confederacy. Upon the peaceful people of the area he waged no war and urged them to remain at home and follow their daily routine. Sibley assured them they had nothing to fear unless they joined the enemy forces or destroyed supplies. The general made an appeal to old comrades in arms of the territory to join him. The proclamation guaranteed to respect the peoples' religious, civil, and political liberties and to free everyone from the yoke of Yankee
military despotism. It established, in its place, Confederate martial law in the Territory! \(^{(17)}\) On the same day, Sibley recognized Colonel Baylor as civil and military governor of Arizona. \(^{(16)}\)

Colonel James Reily, an officer of the Fourth Regiment of Texas Mounted Volunteers, was picked by Sibley early in January to go on an important mission to Mexico. The colonel was to establish relations with the governments of Chihuahua and Sonora. General Sibley, furthermore, wanted Reily to check the rumor that Union forces would pass through Mexico to invade Texas. Reily was also to gain the right to purchase supplies in Mexico, have custom-house dues remitted in El Paso and a bondsman released from Mexican custody. Sibley wanted permission from the Mexican government to allow Confederate troops to enter Mexico in pursuit of hostile Indians, should the need arise, and Reily was so instructed. The mission to Chihuahua was satisfactory and cordial. Relations between the Rebels and Mexico were established, as well as recognition of the Confederacy by Governor Luis Terrazas.

Later in January, 1862, Captain Sherod Hunter’s company of Baylor’s command, was sent by Sibley to take post at Tucson, Arizona. The General wanted to open communications with Southern California where he felt there was sufficient Southern sympathy. He believed that the troops in Tucson would be able to protect the mineral interests of Western Arizona. Meanwhile, Colonel Reily returned from Chihuahua and accompanied Hunter to Tucson. From there Reily continued on his mission to Sonora, Mexico. \(^{(19)}\)

Sibley complained that his failure to be in the field prior to January, 1862, was due to misunderstandings, accidents, and deficiency of arms for his troops. He reported to General Cooper that the Brigade’s strength was only two and one half regiments at that time. The men were not only poorly armed, but thinly clad and many were even without blankets. Smallpox and pneumonia were prevalent among the men. \(^{(20)}\)

**UNION PREPARATIONS**

During all this time, whether or not the people of New Mexico Territory suspected their area was vulnerable to attack from the Rebels is a mute question. However, as early as 1861, a call by the military was issued for additional militia in the Territory. \(^{(21)}\) Recruiting was carried on during the ensuing months and most of the militia groups were mustered in for a period of three to six months. \(^{(22)}\) In August, 1861, after Baylor’s invasion, a call for more troops was made by Colonel E. R. S. Canby, Commander of the Department of New Mexico. \(^{(23)}\) Canby also suspended the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Territory because he believed that persons in the Territory were in communication with the Texans, giving them aid and
comfort. Apparently this suspicion was well founded, because Baylor received word from his agents within a few weeks after Canby's call, of Union troops positions, their numbers, arms and reinforcements. Baylor was also informed that the Mexican population was definitely northern in sentiment.

It wasn't until September 7, 1861, however, that Governor Connelly got around to ordering up troops. In his proclamation, believing the Texans would pursue further aggressions in the Territory, he made an appeal to the patriotism of the New Mexican people and ordered an immediate organization of militia groups. By September 9, 1861, all able bodied men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, were to register with their local Justice of the Peace and thus became subject to service in the militia. Forts Garland, Union, Marcy and Craig, as well as Albuquerque were points of reunion for the volunteers being raised in the Territory. At these places they were organized into companies and squadrons and then assigned definite duty stations. In addition to these forts, military camps were also set up in critical areas. Such a camp near Sabinal was established to serve as a supply depot between Fort Craig and Albuquerque.

The volunteers at this time received three dollars and fifty cents per month in lieu of clothing. Each furnished his own horse, and horse equipment, and received forty cents per diem for their risk.

By October it was fairly certain that the Rebels were threatening the Territory. Governor Connelly ordered all public arms, which had been distributed among the people for protection against Indians, to be turned in, collected, and re-issued to the volunteer companies for the mutual defense of the citizens of the New Mexico Territory. Now all they could do is wait, and watch, for the Texans to make their next move. In order to be able to move against the Confederates, which ever route they would come by, the Union forces were split into two components. Only half of Colonel Edward Canby's force was left at Fort Craig and the other half occupied a point half way between the Rio Grande and Pecos River. Even though the actual invasion route to be taken by the Confederates was uncertain at this time, Governor Connelly felt that the five thousand, five hundred men under arms in the Territory could repel any invasion attempt.

THE CONFEDERATE INVASION OF NEW MEXICO

Sibley's Brigade moved north from Fort Bliss, Texas to Fort Thorn, New Mexico, during the first week in January, 1862. The force advanced to within seven miles of Fort Craig on February 7. Canby reported the Rebels in the vicinity by February 12. A reconnaissance in force was made by the Confederates to within one mile of Fort Craig on February 16.
They offered battle in the open but only a few Union soldiers left the fort. Noel said they formed a battle line and when the Yanks fired upon them with their artillery, they withdrew out of range, with every tenth man ordered to hold a picket line at all costs. Noel also stated that the Confederate force was short of rations — some men with none at all — and that smallpox was still prevalent among the men.

The ruins of Fort Craig, New Mexico. This picture is looking north across the parade ground. Black Mesa (Contadera) is seen on the right, in the distance.

The next day companies M and I of the First United States Cavalry, commanded by Captain Charles Dens, engaged the Confederate force. Little more was done. Canby reported that the Rebels fell back from their advanced position two days later and crossed to the east bank of the Rio Grande at Paraje, seven miles south of the fort.

General Sibley felt his reconnaissance proved the futility of assaulting the fort. His only success, he felt, would be a battle in the open. Sibley decided his next move was to cross the river to the east bank, turn the fort, and force a battle for the re-crossing.

February 20 found the Confederate force opposite Fort Craig on the east bank of the Rio Grande late in the day. Canby immediately ordered a portion of his forces across the river. Colonel Miguel Pino’s volunteer regiment became disorganized by a few Confederate cannon shots. Since night was falling by this time, Canby deemed it necessary to withdraw his forces to the fort.
Colonel Benjamin Roberts made a demonstration upon the Confederates' right flank to mask the withdrawal. (41) Sibley said that some 2,500 infantry and cavalry assaulted his lines and after a few rounds of gunfire the Union forces withdrew. (42)

During the night the Union infantry occupied a point opposite the fort to prevent Confederate lodgement there. However, the Rebels had other matters to attend to because some two or three hundred Confederate horses and mules broke loose, headed for water, and were captured by the Union forces. (43)

**THE BATTLE OF VELVERDE**

The next morning, February 21st, a Confederate force under Colonel Thomas Green was sent to threaten the south side of Fort Craig. (44) At the same time, William R. Scurry was ordered to take possession, as soon as possible, of some point on the river above Fort Craig where water could be obtained. He left the Confederate camp at 8 a.m. (45) Meanwhile, Major C. L. Pyron, with one hundred and eighty men, set out ahead of Scurry to check the road leading to the river near Valverde. (46)

Canby detected the Confederate movement about the same time Scurry left the Rebel camp, and sent Colonel Roberts with the regular and volunteer cavalry to hold the ford at Valverde. He was followed by two sections of Captain Alexander McRae's Battery and Lieutenant Robert H. Hall's two twenty-four pounder howitzers supported by four companies of regular and volunteer troops. (47)

Pyron sent word back to Sibley that the road was clear. He proceeded toward the river but when he reached the bosque, along the east bank, he discovered what he supposed to be four companies of Union cavalry. He attacked and the Yanks withdrew to his left. Pyron followed but upon reaching the bank of a slough found himself in front of a large force of small arms. (48)

The Union force had spotted the Confederate approach upon reaching the Valverde ford. Immediately two companies of cavalry, under Colonel Jose Valdez, crossed the river to the east bank, dismounted, and took positions to hold the ford against Pyron and his men. (49)

Pyron formed his men along the bank and held his position for over an hour when he was relieved by Colonel Scurry and his regiment. Scurry, having heard Pyron's plight, rushed to his aid and joined Pyron on his right flank. This position was held for nearly two hours. The Confederate force was at this point not over seven hundred men. (50)

Captain Trevanion Teel, meanwhile, protecting the rear of the Confederate supply train, heard of the Union movement toward Valverde. He
hurried to the battlefield and had the artillery pieces placed about center of Scurry’s regiment. At 10 a.m., McRae’s Battery was drawn-up and opened fire upon the Confederate position. Twenty minutes later the Confederates opened an effective fire upon the Union forces. The cannonading continued back and forth for two hours.

Colonel Green received orders to support Scurry and Pyron. He left a sufficient force to protect the Confederate supply train moving around Black Mesa and headed for Valverde. The train was stretched out for several miles and suddenly became threatened by a Union force which appeared on the mesa. Green had taken eight companies to the battlefield. Five of the companies were placed upon the line between Scurry and Pyron and the other three companies were sent back to drive the Union force from the north point of the mesa where they threatened the train and the Confederate left flank. Green then moved up to the line and took command.

Gun emplacement on top of Black Mesa (Contadera) overlooking the Valverde Battlefield.

At Fort Craig, as the Confederate move became more evident, Canby recalled Seldon’s Battalion and nine companies from the east side of the river and sent them forward to reinforce Colonel Roberts. Colonel Christopher Carson’s regiment of New Mexico Volunteers followed. By early afternoon only two companies of Volunteers, a regiment of militia under Colonel Manuel Armijo and some detachments of regular troops remained to garrison the fort. Colonel Pino’s regiment was recalled from the east side
of the river and along with a company of cavalry, and the remaining section of McRae’s battery, Canby set out for the upper ford. (55)

The Confederate forces by noon had taken positions further up the river. Captain Seldon arrived about noon and took positions up river to attack the Confederates with bayonets. Colonel Carson was placed in a bosque area higher up river to protect Robert’s rear. (56) Seldon’s attack was opened about three o’clock upon Scurry’s command and drove them from their position. Captain Lang made a charge against Seldon with his lancers but his company was repelled with heavy losses. Lang’s charge did bring the Union forces into effectual range of the Confederate guns, which in turn forced Seldon’s men to withdraw with heavy losses. (57)

Just before sunset, Lieutenant Thomas Ochiltree brought an order to prepare for a charge all along the line. At the command the charge was made straight at the Union battery some seven hundred yards to the front. (58)

Canby meanwhile planned to attack the Confederate left flank. McRae’s battery resting on the river formed the left, Seldon’s regiment of infantry and Carson’s volunteers the center, Hall’s battery with infantry support and Duncan’s cavalry the right. Pin’s Volunteers, a squadron of the First Cavalry and Valdez’s Volunteers were held in reserve. With this arrangement, Canby hoped to advance on the right and center, using the left as a pivot, and force the Confederate left flank, get behind their position and drive them from the field. Canby ordered Carson across the river. McRae’s battery was further supported by Plympton’s battalion. Colonel Pino was ordered to cross the river as a reserve for the Union left. While these arrangements were under way, Hall’s battery was attacked. Ingraham’s company and Wingate’s battalion moved to support Hall. (59)

McRae’s battery was threatened at this point by several infantry columns, Colonel Green reported this charge numbered about one thousand men. It was made over open plain, thinly interspersed with cottonwoods. (60)

The Union forces supporting McRae’s battery fled and passing through Plympton’s battalion carried some of his command along with them. (61) Many of these fleeing men were driven into the river where the Confederate soldiers killed them with shot guns and six shooters. (62)

Major Henry Ragnet, in command of the Confederate cavalry, was ordered to charge the Union left. The charge was made in single rank to within one hundred yards of the Union line. Confusion to the rear caused him to order his men to fall back to the sand hill on his left. Ragnet, upon arriving there, found his command continuing to fall back to the sand hills beyond this point. (63)
Ragnet’s charge was made against Duncan’s force which had been reinforced by Captain Ingraham and Colonel Carson. Carson reported that after the combined command had advanced some four hundred yards an enemy charge was made diagonal to his position. The whole column poured a volley into the Confederate force and they broke and ran.\(^{(64)}\)

The Confederate charge made by Ragnet suffered severely but effected its object by occupying the enemy on the left while the frontal charge was made. As soon as the enemy was routed in front, the Confederates turned to the left and routed the enemy using the twenty-four pounders on them. The Confederates won the six pieces of artillery with their entire equipage, and many small arms dropped by the fleeing Union forces.\(^{(65)}\)

Valverde Battlefield from the top of Black Mesa (Contadera) looking north. The Rio Grande River is to the left.

Canby, seeing the Confederates reinforced and realizing nothing could be gained, ordered Seldon to fall back slowly to cover the retreat and ordered the other commanders to the west side of the river. Across the river, the troops were scattered. Pino’s regiment was in wild confusion and its was impossible to restore order. Canby said that more than one hundred of his command deserted.\(^{(66)}\)

The Confederates kept firing upon the Union forces until their rear was out of range.\(^{(67)}\) Scurry, Ragnet, and five companies, all mounted, pursued the fleeing Union forces but were ordered back upon reaching the opposite bank of the river.\(^{(68)}\)
The losses were greatest among the Union forces. Canby officially reported sixty eight killed, one hundred and sixty wounded and thirty five missing.\(^{(68)}\) The Confederate force lost thirty six killed, one hundred and fifty wounded and one missing.\(^{(70)}\)

Colonel Canby, in his critique of Valverde, stated that the battle was fought almost entirely by regular troops, with no assistance from the militia and very little aid from the volunteers who refused to obey orders, or obeyed them too late. Canby reported that after the battle large numbers of the militia and volunteers deserted which, he felt, added to his strength. Besides superior Confederate numbers, the Confederacy possessed a superior mobility of its free, which was all mounted. The Rebels were able to evade Union attacks and concentrate superior numbers at any point because of the ground they occupied. The Union infantry, while holding Confederates in check at the lower end of Black Mesa, had to march seven miles and ford twice a deep and rapid stream in order to engage the enemy. The Union troops always encountered a superior force - never less than two, and often four, to one.\(^{(71)}\) This appears to be an exaggeration since Canby reported that his forces numbered 3,810 at Fort Craig on February 21, 1862.\(^{(72)}\) Sibley reported that his forces did not exceed 1,750 on the field during the day.\(^{(73)}\)

Sibley's Brigade remained at Valverde for two days burying their dead and caring for the wounded. A Council of War was held by Sibley. The Council decided to leave Fort Craig and move on up the Rio Grande to Albuquerque where supplies could be obtained. The men had only five days rations when they resumed the march.\(^{(74)}\)

**THE CONFEDERATES ADVANCE NORTH**

Colonel Pino's command left Fort Craig the night of February 22, with orders to move up the valley and protect supplies at Polvadera.\(^{(75)}\) Two days later, near Limitar, Pino received orders to fall back to Socorro. Pino arrived there the next day and ordered an advance guard of fourteen men under Captain Gutierrez south of town. Gutierrez shortly saw, about dark, the Confederate picket approaching. Pino sent two companies under Colonel Baca to reconnoiter the Confederate force. Baca ordered Gutierrez to dislodge the Confederate force. A forward movement was executed by Gutierrez. The Confederate line fired a shot upon withdrawing to the main Confederate body. Baca's party returned the fire.

Pino assigned posts to various contingents with the order for the men to remain under arms. Meanwhile the Confederates occupied a rise to the southwest of Socorro with their artillery and about 8 p.m. fired a shot over the town.\(^{(76)}\)
Noel, who contacted small pox at Fort Fillmore and reported information given him by others, said that the Confederate force coming near Socorro met a few Yanks who offered resistance. He commented that resistance was returned—that three Yanks were killed and two wounded, with no losses to the Rebels. The Yanks upon seeing this fled leaving a sacked and burned town to the Rebels. This was false as the Union force surrendered to Colonel McNeil as stated below.

The cannon shot fired over the town by the Confederates caused some of the Militia in Socorro to desert and hide.

Meanwhile Major Wesche, commanding the Second New Mexico Militia and the Adjutant, Gonzales, visited homes of influential Mexicans urging them to take up arms. They gained little and found the population to be quite indifferent to the whole matter.

The Alcalde of the town arrived with a message that Lieutenant Simmons, a Confederate officer, desired an interview with Colonel Pino. Pino sent Major Wesche to see what the Lieutenant wanted. Simmons reported that Colonel McNeil asked for the unconditional surrender of the town. The Confederates received the reply that they would be met on the plain south of town at day break. Wesche upon riding back found the Union pickets had disappeared and that Confederate forces were in position to the very houses of Socorro. Colonel McNeil returned with Wesche to Pino's headquarters. Several officers came in during the meeting and reported that their men had deserted and only thirty seven remained. Pino then went to the Confederate position and saw that he was greatly outnumbered. He was sure that no relief was coming to aid him. Pino surrendered at 8 a.m. on April 25. At 10 a.m. the same day a force of at least one hundred and fifty Militia men took the oath of neutrality, having come from their hiding places after the danger was over.

The Militia roll for Captain Atanacio Ulibarri's command showed the company mustered in on February 20, at Fort Craig. This same company was taken prisoner at Socorro on February 24. The officers were paroled and the men turned loose. They had served four days!

Doctor Edward N. Covey and Samuel B. Maney established a hospital at Socorro for the Confederate wounded. The Confederate force then continued up the valley with no interruptions. Sibley mentioned abandoning whole trains and due to lack of forage one regiment became dismounted. Noel said that horses were dying at a rate of one hundred per day due to lack of forage.

Lieutenant J. Ash Dowden wrote to Noel and said that the march from Socorro to Albuquerque was accomplished with no marked incidents—save
occasionally a few surprised looking Mexican women grazing in wonder. Not a Blue Coat was seen and it was not until about one mile from Albuquerque that their works were seen. (83)

Captain Herbert M. Enos, Assistant Quartermaster, at Albuquerque received word on the afternoon of March 1, that a force of about four hundred Texans had reached Belen, New Mexico. He ordered that all supplies that could not be carried off destroyed. At 6 p.m. Enos received word that a Texan force of fifty men had captured a civilian train in Los Lunas. Meanwhile ammunition and ordnance supplies were sent to Santa Fe, and eight or nine harnessed teams stood ready to move at a moments notice. These teams contained the baggage of some militia and volunteer companies and twelve Regulars.

The night was quite. Enos received no word of troops coming to hold the town. The remaining supplies were fired at 6:30 a.m. on March 2. Many Mexicans waited all night for an opportunity to seize the supplies. They now rushed for them. The majority of the supplies had been burned in the buildings containing them.

Three wagons were carried off by deserting Militia and Volunteers while camped near Sandia Pueblo. Six wagons sent to the mountains for fuel on March 1 and later ordered to Santa Fe were missed and reportedly attacked and carried off by Mexican robbers. (84)

Company L of the Third Regiment of New Mexico Volunteers, under the command of Captain Santiago Gonzales, dispensed with their arms to avoid being taken by the Confederates when they arrived at Albuquerque. The officers went to Fort Union and joined the forces there. (85)

Dowden's letter stated that the Confederates upon approaching Albuquerque viewed three large columns of smoke. (86)

Major James Donaldson, Quartermaster at Santa Fe, on March 4 abandoned that town. He loaded a train of one hundred and twenty wagons with stores. Donaldson believed the town to be undefensible because of the surrounding hills. The train went to Fort Union and was valued at a quarter of a million dollars. The Major was accompanied by two companies of Regulars, a company of Colorado Volunteers, two mounted howitzers and some New Mexican Volunteers, who deserted along the way. (87)

Captain Francisco Aragon was in command of a detachment of Union forces at Cubero, New Mexico. The muster roll of the company showed that there were seventy seven men in the company. The Command moved from Albuquerque on January 17 and arrived to take post at Cubero on January 21. Aragon became commander on February 14. Twenty five men had deserted this post between February 25 and the second of March. (88)
The small force numbered only forty two Volunteers, Doctor Boyd, the Post Surgeon, and three Americans on March 3. Doctor F. E. Kavenaugh, the sutter at Cubero, in command of the three Americans, demanded surrender of the post that same morning. Kavenaugh demanded surrender of the post, its supplies and men, allowing ten minutes for an answer. One of the Americans was sent to receive the arms at the end of the time. Aragon surrendered the post along with valuable quartermaster, commissary and ordnance stores. There was a well supplied surgery and not less than sixty arms and three thousand rounds of ammunition.

Captain Aragon and his men were furnished arms and transportation to Albuquerque. Doctor Kavenaugh dispatched Mister Richmond Gillespie to Albuquerque to inform the Confederate commander of the surrender and asked for assistance to hold it. Captain A. S. Thurmond and twenty five men arrived on March 5 and took command. (89)

Dowd'en's letter to Noel stated that the Confederates had not been in town half an hour when Mister Gillespie arrived. Thurmond, he said, sent twenty five wagon loads of commissaries and twenty nine thousand rounds of ammunition. (90)

Sibley reported that ample supplies were found at Albuquerque, Santa Fe and Cubero — enough to last for three months. (91)

Pyron was sent to Santa Fe from Albuquerque. Sibley planned to demonstrate on Fort Union. Scurry with the Fourth and a battalion of Steele's regiment was sent to Gallisteo. Green with the Fifth, due to crippled transportation, held check to any movement from Fort Craig. (92)

THE BATTLES OF APACHE CANYON AND GLORIETA

Colonel John Slough, in command of the Colorado Volunteers, arrived at Fort Union on the 11 of March. Colonel Gabriel Paul was in command, but due to the seniority of Slough's commission, the latter took command. The force, numbering 1,342, was re-organized under Slough. The morning of March 22 the command moved out from Fort Union. Four days later the force camped at Bernal Springs. Major John M. Chivington, commanding two hundred cavalrymen and one hundred and eighty infantrymen, advanced toward Santa Fe on March 26. They hoped to defeat or capture the Confederate force there under Pyron. (93) Major Pyron, meanwhile, was reinforced by four companies of the Fifth under Major Shropshire. (94)

Major Chivington reported leaving Bernal Springs at 3 p.m. They marched until mid-night. Lieutenant Nelson, with twenty men, surprised the Confederate pickets at 2 a.m. on the twenty sixth and captured them later in the morning. The detachment continued on and at Apache Canyon ran into the advanced guard of the Confederate force and captured two Confederate lieutenants.
The Confederates began shelling Chivington's command. Companies A and E of the Colorado Volunteers were deployed to the left on the mountainside. Company D of the Colorado Volunteers moved to the right on the mountainside. The cavalry was held in readiness to charge when the cannon were about to withdraw. The Confederate force fell back about one and one half miles and occupied a more advantageous position. Their skirmishers completely covered the mountain sides in order to support their guns below. (95)

Pyron sent word to Scurry at Gallistee that he was engaged with the enemy some sixteen miles distant. In ten minutes Scurry's force marched. Scurry sent his train ahead with a guard of one hundred men under Lieutenant Taylor to a point six miles behind Pyron. Scurry and the main command marched directly to Pyron across the mountains. Steep roads caused the men to haul the artillery themselves. At 3 p.m. the force reached Pyron at his Johnson's Ranch camp. An agreed cessation of hostilities had been declared until 8 a.m. the next day. (96)

Chivington re-grouped his force upon the Confederate withdrawal. He deployed Company D on the right and companies A and E on the left. The cavalry was dismounted and deployed as skirmishers, except for Captain Cook's Company F. Cook's company was ordered to charge as soon as the Confederates gave way before the Union fire. One hour later the Confederates prepared to withdraw again. Company F attacked and over ran their lines. Company C and D poured a heavy fire into the Confederate position and forced them up a canyon on the left. A large number of prisoners was taken by companies A and B. At sundown Chivington's force made a hurried retreat to Pigeon's Ranch and camped for the night. Company B remained in the area until 9:30 p.m. and then returned to re-join Chivington. Chivington reported five killed and fourteen wounded. They took seventy one prisoners. (97)

The next morning, Scurry waited for the Union attack. He waited all day and until the morning of March 28. Scurry then decided to attack the Union forces. A small wagon guard was left behind while he, with portions of seventeen companies and three pieces of artillery, marched forward. Details and other causes reduced his force to about six hundred men. The enemy was contacted six miles from his morning camp, in Glorieta Canyon. (98)

At Bernal Springs the Union forces under Slough broke camp about noon on the twenty seventh. At 2 p.m. they had reached Kozlowski's Ranch where they joined Chivington. The force moved upon the Confederates the next day in two columns. The intention was to reconnoiter the enemy's position at Johnson's Ranch. One hour and a half after they moved from the Kozlowski Ranch the force arrived at Pigeon's Ranch, about five miles
flanks. The cavalry, with some infantry, supported the batteries. Captain Charles Walker, commanding the advance company, moved into the timber to the left as soon as the Confederates opened fire. The company dismounted and began skirmishing on foot.

Captain Ritter's battery of two twelve pounder howitzers and two six pounder guns, took position on the road a few hundred yards west of Pigeon's Ranch.

Colonel Samuel Tappen deployed one company of his command to the hillside on the right and another company to the left. Two other companies supported the two Union batteries. Company I suffered badly on the right and within a half hour had fallen back to Pigeon Ranch. Tappen with ninety men meantime occupied a hill on the left to prevent a possible Confederate threat to the Union's flank and rear. His line of skirmishers was thus extended some three forths of a mile. A force appeared at this position wearing Colorado Volunteer uniforms. They were discovered to be Confederates, were fired upon, and they fled. The Union line fell back from the valley to Tappen's right by this time. Tappen gave the order to fall back at this point and closed in with his troops with the rear of the Union column.

The Union forces had disappeared by the time the Confederates had reunited. The two guns opened fire to try to ascertain the enemy's position. At the same time Major Shropshire was sent to the right into the pines. He was to find the enemy and attack their flank. Major Ragnet with similar orders moved to the left. The center would charge as soon as they had heard their guns. Major Shropshire was killed which delayed the assault on the right. Scurry took command and immediately attacked the enemy who had been discovered at Pigeon's Ranch. Pyron and Ragnet opened fire upon the enemy's left from sheltering rocks. The charge down the middle drove the Union forces from the ranch to a ledge of rocks. Here the Union forces made their final stand, shelling the Confederates with grape, canister and shell. An attempt by the Confederates to take the guns failed. The Confederate right and center combined on the left. The Union infantry broke ranks and fled from the field. The Confederates pursued until over come with exhaustion.

Major Chivington during the action at Glorieta continued on the road to Galisteo for some eight miles. At that point he cut off, and for eight more miles traveled without a road guided by Colonel Manuel Chavez. His command arrived at a point above Johnson's Ranch at 1:30 p.m. They found eighty wagons and one field piece in charge of some two hundred Confederates. Captain Wynkoop and thirty men were deployed to the mountain-
side to silence the Confederate guns. The rest charged and surrounded the wagons and buildings. The wagons were burned and one containing ammunition exploded. The explosion wounded Private Ritter who was the only man injured. Chivington lost twenty seven men and had sixty three wounded. Seventeen prisoners were captured along with thirty horses and mules. Chivington learned of the battle at Glorieta from five Union prisoners held at the supply train. (106)

The remains of the Pigeon Ranch as they appeared in 1963.

The Battle of Glorieta raged for five hours. The action on the part of the Union forces was defensive. About 5 p.m. there was a truce from the Confederates and both sides gathered up their dead and wounded. Slough stated that all of the action of the twenty sixth and twenty eighth was done to annoy and harass the enemy. Slough considered the Confederate position in the mountains too strong and decided to occupy some position more favorable to the Union forces in defending Fort Union. Slough reported the Union dead as twenty eight men and forty wounded. (107)

The Confederates remained at the battle field during the twenty ninth burying the dead and caring for the wounded. Snow nearly a foot deep fell the night of the twenty eighth. (108) Scurry moved to Santa Fe for food and supplies as he was without supplies for two days. (109) He reported thirty six killed and sixty wounded. (110)
THE CONFEDERATE EVACUATION

Sibley meanwhile occupied Santa Fe for nearly one month. Supplies and forage were exhausted and he planned to move to Manzano. Canby's press upon Albuquerque caused him to abandon this plan. The entire Confederate force moved toward Albuquerque.\[11\] A Mister Howell in his report to Noel stated that the Confederate Army in Albuquerque at the time of withdrawal had fifteen days rations, thirty to forty rounds of ammunition per man and all were "tolerably" well clothed.\[12\]

Colonel Canby reported leaving Fort Craig on April 1. Eight days later he was before Albuquerque. Captain Graydon's Spy Company immediately made a demonstration upon the town to ascertain the Confederate strength. Colonel Roberts reported the demonstration was composed of artillery combats and sharp skirmishes.\[13\] Canby hoped that this would draw the troops from Santa Fe. He then planned to effect a junction by a night march and cut off the Confederate retreat. The night of March ninth, and during the tenth, the command marched to San Antonio east of the Sandia Mountains.\[14\] Colonel Paul left Fort Union on the sixth of April to form a junction with Canby at Tijeras.\[15\]

The Confederates began evacuating Albuquerque the morning of April 12. Scurry's Fourth, a battalion of Steele's regiment, Pyron's command and part of the artillery moved to the west bank of the Rio Grande. Green's regiment was to follow but found the ford difficult. The next day Green moved south to Peralta along the east bank of the river.\[16\]

The Union force moved to Peralta on April 14.\[17\] Canby cannonaded Green's position but it was reported as harmless. The Confederate forces at Los Lunas went to Green's aid under Scurry. Sibley attempted to go to his aid but Union cavalry forced him to retreat back across the river. The fourteenth was spent in ineffectual firing from both sides. The same night Sibley ordered the whole army to the west bank of the river.\[18\] The next morning the Confederates moved south, down the river.\[19\]

Canby's command pursued the Confederate force down river on the left bank. On the sixteenth they overtook the rear of Sibley's force. The march of the two armies continued during that day on the opposite sides of the river from each other. Both remained just out of cannon range of the other. That night the camps were opposite one another.\[20\]

Sibley stated that his original plan was to get two days start on the Union force. He planned to attack Fort Craig and destroy it. The plan was defeated because of Green not finding a ford. Sibley decided finally to
avoid Fort Craig. He retreated around the fort by way of the mountains and came out on the Rio Grande below the fort.\( ^{[121]} \)

The flight of the Confederates was so hurried that they left wagons, caissons, shells, cannon, hospital supplies, and much of their personal equipment strewn all along their route. In the Magdelena Mountains they left several dead only partially buried.\( ^{[122]} \)

Confederate Mountain Howitzer in the Plaza in Albuquerque, New Mexico. This gun was one of six which were buried by the retreating Confederate forces near the plaza in 1862. The Armijo home is to the right. This building was reconstructed in the 1930's.

The detour around the mountains was accomplished in ten days with only seven days rations. The river was forded to the east bank and Sibley's remaining forces were quartered from Dona Ana to Fort Bliss, Texas.\( ^{[123]} \)

The Confederates abandoned thirty eight wagons and much of their supplies when they fled to the mountains. Canby's troops after securing the abandoned wagons marched on to Polvadera. The command rested there for a day while the enemy's position was assured. The march then continued to Fort Craig, arriving there on the twenty second of April.\( ^{[124]} \)
The Confederate expedition was a complete failure. Not one of the objectives had been accomplished. Many men had died and suffered for nothing. General Sibley was criticized on several accounts. He was warned by Colonel Baylor of the unfriendly attitude of the Mexican population. In Texas, before embarking upon his expedition, it was known to him that supplies were not available without money, and he had very little. At Fort Bliss his force was badly equipped. Certainly Sibley knew that reinforcements would not be forthcoming after his own trouble recruiting in Texas. The man's knowledge of New Mexico must have told him of the lack of forage for his animals. His biggest mistake was leaving an enemy at Fort Craig between him and his base of supply.

Sibley was certainly a very poor commander.

The leadership of the other Confederate officers seemed to be good. They appeared devoted to the cause and did well in battle.

In a report written to the Confederate States Adjutant General, on May 4, 1862, Sibley said he felt, except for the political-geographical position of New Mexico, that it was not worth a quarter of the blood and treasure expended in its conquest. He found it inhospitable and hostile. His troops detested the country and the people. It was a pity, that Sibley lacked the foresight to see this earlier!

The Union forces did well under Canby and their officers. The issue of desertions on the part of the New Mexico Volunteers appeared to be controversial. The Muster Rolls of the New Mexico Volunteers showed that there were a number of desertions, especially after Valverde and the occupation of Albuquerque. On the other hand the volunteer companies received little training. Many felt that the cause was not their own as they saw little difference between the "Anglos." Many of the Volunteers who were counted as deserters were just as often away at the grazing camps, sick, or on detached leave. It was noted on one of the Muster Rolls (532) that Major Paul at Fort Union was counting all men as deserters who were absent at the mustering out of their respective companies. It was further noted on one Muster Roll (545) that men were dismissed upon the road from Fort Craig to Fort Union. It was just as often noted that missing men reported at later dates to their units or Alcaldes.

The deciding battle in the whole campaign was the Battle of Glorieta and Chivington's destruction of the Confederate supply train. This battle prevented the possible fall of Fort Union and guaranteed the Union's control over New Mexico and the Southwest.

The four months of the campaign was a tragic affair for the Confederate cause. It gained them nothing but dead and disillusioned followers. — Glory and Honor could not even be their claim!
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Hall, Martin Hardwick. **Sibley's New Mexico Campaign.** Austin: University of Texas Press, 1960. The best all around account of the Civil War in New Mexico.

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NOTES

Prelude


Robert N. Scott (Comp.), War of the Rebellion (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1883), Series I, IV, pp. 109-110, 135. Hereafter, this source will be cited as O. R. unless otherwise noted, all citations are to Series I.


3. Captain John Henry Mink's Independent Company of New Mexico Mounted Volunteers was engaged with the Texans at Alamosa on September 25, 1861. The command was captured by the Rebels and the men were immediately paroled and then released. Their military instruction and appearance was said to be "tolerable" but their clothing was very bad and they lacked arms and accoutrements. This would make it difficult to win a battle! New Mexico Militia Roll No. 519. Hereafter, this source will be cited as M. R.


10. Ibid., pp. 107, 115.


12. Ibid., pp. 141-143. General Sibley to Adj. General C. S. A.


17. Ibid., pp. 89-90. Sibley's Proclamation.


**UNION PREPARATIONS**

22. M. R. 520.
24. Ibid., Canby's Proclamation, August 6, 1861.
27. Ibid., G. O. 1 C. P. Clever, September 9, 1861.
28. Ibid., G. O. 38, September 18, 1861.
29. This camp apparently had several names - Ojo del Oso, Ojo del Gallo, Fort Fauntlery and Fort Lyon, Camp Connelly. Ibid., G. O. 41, September 25, 1861.

**THE CONFEDERATE INVASION OF NEW MEXICO**

33. Ibid., p. 507, General Sibley to Adjutant General, C.S.A.
34. Ibid., p. 488, Col. Canby to Adjutant General, U.S.A.
35. Ibid., p. 507, General Sibley to Adjutant General C.S.A.
36. Noel, pp. 21-27.
37. M. R. 455.
38. Many of the Union soldiers at Fort Craig expressed an unfavorable opinion about the willingness of Canby to fight his brother-in-law, Sibley. Especially since everybody had wanted to fight, according to F. Stanley on page 158 in his book *Fort Union* (Denver: The World Press, 1953). Hall, in his book *Sibley's New Mexico Campaign*, in a footnote on page 79, stated that he found no valid evidence that Sibley and Canby were brothers-in-law.
40. Ibid., p. 507. General Sibley to Adjutant General, C.S.A.
41. Ibid., p. 498. Col. Canby to Adjutant General, U.S.A.
THE BATTLE OF VALVERDE


47. Ibid., p. 489. Col. Canby to Adjutant General, U.S.A.


54. Seldon's command included Captain Theodore H. Dodd's Company of Colorado Volunteer Infantry which had arrived in time to join the Army of Canby. (Hall, 1960:73).

55. O.R., IX, pp. 488-89. Col. Canby to Adjutant General, U.S.A.

56. Ibid., pp. 493-96. Col. Roberts to Captain Nicodemus.


60. Ibid., p. 520. Col. Green to Major Jackson.

61. Ibid., pp. 489-91. Col. Canby to Adjutant General, U.S.A.


64. Ibid., pp. 502-03. Col. Carson to Colonel Roberts.


69. Ibid., p. 593. Col. Canby to Adjutant General, U.S.A.

73. Ibid., p. 508. General Sibley to Adjutant General, C.S.A.
74. Ibid., p. 508. General Sibley to Adjutant General, C.S.A.

**THE CONFEDERATE ADVANCE NORTH**

76. O.R., IX, pp. 604-07. Major Wesche to General Canby.
77. Noel, pp. 30-32.
78. O.R., IX, pp. 604-07. Major Wesche to General Canby.
80. Noel, p. 32.
81. O.R., IX, p. 541. General Sibley to Adjutant General, C.S.A.
82. Noel, p. 32.
83. Ibid., p. 33.
85. M. R. 537.
86. Noel, p. 33.
90. Noel, p. 34.
91. When the Confederates entered Albuquerque, merchants Manuel and Rafael Armijo came forward, declared their sympathy for the Southern cause, and surrendered $200,000 worth of goods. O.R., IX, p. 511.
93. Ibid., p. 534. Col. Slough to Adjutant General, U.S.A.
94. Ibid., p. 509. General Sibley to Adjutant General, C.S.A.
95. Ibid., pp. 530-31. Major Chivington to General Canby.
97. Ibid., pp. 530-31. Major Chivington to General Canby.
99. Ibid., p. 534. Col. Slough to Adjutant General, U.S.A.
101. Ibid., pp. 534-35. Col. Slough to Adjutant General, U.S.A.
104. Ibid., pp. 536-38. Col. Tappan to Capt. Chapin.
107. Ibid., pp. 534-35. Col. Slough to Adjutant General, U.S.A.
108. Ibid., Noel, p. 35.
112. Ibid., Noel, p. 38.
118. The Confederates left sixty wagons at the river. The stream was so
swollen it was impossible to get them across. O.R., IX, p. 665. Gov.
Connelly to Sec. Seward.
120. Ibid., pp. 550-51. Col. Canby to Adj. Gen., U.S.A.