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COVER PHOTOGRAPH
Douglas' newsboys ready to spread news to readers, concerning revolutionary activity in Mexico, circa 1913.

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In his *On The Border With Crook*, John Gregory Bourke observed that army life on the western frontier was more a potential bore than a continuous confrontation with the Indians. Though there was much of interest to occupy the attention of those willing to make the effort—and thereby combat the deleterious effects of ennui upon a post's morale—most of a garrison's personnel chose not to take advantage of the opportunities which abounded before them. As an exception to this state of affairs, Captain Bourke was all the more outstanding because his interest was the ethnology of the Native American who inhabited the Southwest. Much could be learned, Bourke believed, from the life and manners of that “race which the Americans have so frequently fought, so generally mismanaged, and so completely failed to understand.” Because he inspired trust and possessed a high degree of understanding—as well as an open, keen, and inquiring mind—so essential to his work, Bourke collected a large body of knowledge about the customs and life ways of a culture which would not long remain the same. Yet, lest the Captain's significance be missed, Bourke's ethnological labors cannot be divorced from his role as a military officer. Stationed in Arizona during the final phase of the Apache wars, Bourke was perhaps even more remarkable because he exhibited a greater degree of concern for his ethnological studies among the Apaches, as well as a desire that justice be shown these people, than whether a handful of renegades were rounded up—this despite the general howl in favor of exterminating these Indians. Bourke consistently adhered to this attitude whether at headquarters, in camp, in the field, or on the trail. What follows is a brief glimpse into Bourke's ethnological labors among the Apaches of Southern Arizona in relation to the course of his military duties for the years 1882-1886.

John Gregory Bourke was no stranger to Arizona and the Apaches who inhabited this Territory when he and General George Crook arrived at Whipple Barracks, Prescott, on September 4, 1882. He was there in the early 1870s when Crook resolved the Apache difficulties of that time. During the interim, incompetence and corruption on the part of military and civil officials served to undo the General's accomplishments for the Apaches. Matters were brought to a head in the summer of 1881 by an attempt on the part of the military to seize the Apache medicine man Nochaydelklinne encamped at Cibecue Creek. This abortive affair resulted in renewed outbreaks and depredations. In answer to the demands for action by frustrated Arizonans, the War Department sent General Crook to quell this latest disturbance.

Once settled at headquarters, the General desired to gather at
first hand information relating to the current state of affairs, to confer with the Indians, and to devise a plan which would lead to a successful resolution of the issue.\(^1\) Crook might well be laying the groundwork for future action against the hostiles, but the Territory's citizens knew immediately what they wanted. Crook was not expected to change an obnoxious Indian policy; rather, instant results in the field were what counted. The labor ahead was "no holiday work." The Apaches were treacherous and insolent because they considered themselves immune from government reprisal. Crook had to show the "petted vagabonds of the Agency" that they could no longer "roam at liberty and murder for pleasure." Only when the military accomplished this objective would the settler no longer fear for his safety.\(^2\)

On September 12, 1882, Bourke journeyed with Crook to Camp Apache to interview the Indians. While in transit, Severiano brought Uilemsi, Alchise, Cutmouth Moses, and others, to discuss with Crook their difficulties. After their just and good friend departed Arizona, matters became so desperate, they did not "know whom to believe; everyone told them a different story." Indians at both Fort Apache and San Carlos elaborated upon this theme and presented other grievances. Besides a dismal climate and poor health conditions, there was little to eat. Sanchez expressed the situation well.

"I am not content here; none of the agents have ever been good to us. I would sooner be in my own country without rations than live here, even if the agent was to give me rations and all that was promised me. I know that stuff is sent here for us from Washington, but I don't know what becomes of it, it never gets to the Indians... you know very well that lots of stuff is sent here in wagons. ... Who gets it? ... It is very sickly here, my people have been very sickly all the time. The agent don't give us enough. ... For twenty persons, for seven days' rations we get the shoulder of a beef."

Sanchez then launched into a bitter diatribe against agent Joseph Tiffany.

"There was an agent came here sometime since with a big belly. I don't know what he was sent here for; he was the worst we ever had. None of his papers were good, none of his passes, none of his orders were good and nothing he said was good. He said on paper that he was feeding a good many Indians; this was a lie, as there were many Indians who never got any rations."\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Prescott Courier (Prescott, Arizona), September 4, 1882.

\(^2\) Arizona Daily Star (Tucson, Arizona), September 7, 1882.

\(^3\) Diary of Captain John Gregory Bourke, September 25, 1882, Volume 63, pp. 3214-3215 (hereafter cited as BD), Coronado Room, Department of Special Collections, Zimmerman Library, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico. The originals are in the custody of the United States Military Academy Library, West Point, New York. The bound volumes of Bourke's Diary in the possession of Zimmerman Library were printed from the microfilm edition.
There also existed the problem of military representatives relaying false information to the Indians thereby exciting them into a state of agitation. Shortly after Crook’s conference with the Apaches, Alchise’s mother rushed up to the General and inquired whether he indeed intended to incarcerate those with whom he recently conferred. General Crook immediately directed Bourke, who described this tale as “a base and wicked lie” to inform the commanding officer of Fort Apache that such was not the case. Sharp and to the point, Bourke explained that such senseless reports only served to produce enmity in their wake. As such, “General Crook directs that you order your interpreter to be more exact in his statements.” Indians were not to be placed in the post stockade without explicit orders, nor were they to be threatened. On the whole, Crook considered his discussions with the disaffected Apaches fruitful. He managed to arrive “at a thorough understanding with them,” and believed there was not “a hostile Apache in Arizona.” The problem centered around the hostile Chiricahuas who fled the reservation into Mexico, for some time would elapse before the depredations could be eliminated.

While visiting the Apache villages on the San Carlos, Bourke described several scenes which surrounded him. *Jacales,* or houses, were constructed with willow or cottonwood saplings thrust into the ground at both ends and were covered with grass, corn stalks, calico, or rawhide. The women “when not nursing their children, or cooking, were occupied in drying large piles of the sweet bean of the mesquite; the men devoted their energies to coaxing a crop of corn and melons from the reluctant soil.” Meanwhile, renegades led by chief Nodiskay surrendered to Crook on September twenty-ninth. They also told “of incompetency and imbecility in our military administration and open, unblushing fraud on the part of Agent Tiffany, who while stealing the food and blankets intended for them, had been careful to make a distribution of Bibles and hymnbooks.”

At this time, Bourke made the acquaintance of P. P. Wilcox who had recently replaced Tiffany as the San Carlos Agent. Wilcox explained he was not very anxious to accept his new post, and took the position on the condition that Crook be reassigned to Arizona. Referring to the former agent, Wilcox expressed the sentiment that it was a “great pity the Apaches didn’t kill the damned scoundrel.” Tiffany was a “‘damned hypocrite’ who . . . snivelled about religion while he was robbing the Indians with both hands.” That the agent sold the Apaches’ annuity goods to Globe business establishments for his own profit was bad enough. Worse yet, the government seriously erred by forcing so many Indians acclimatized to mountainous regions onto an unhealthful and unproductive area.

4 Ibid., pp. 3221-3222.
5 Ibid., p. 3193.
6 Ibid., p. 3229.
7 Ibid., September 27, 1882, p. 3235.
Soon after the interview with Agent Wilcox, Bourke continued on the march to Fort Thomas, Willcox, and the region encompassed by the Dos Cabezas and Graham Mountains. On October fourth, scouts Navajo Billy, Tule Cheuni, Chkinta and Koteula went to Sonora in an attempt to speak with Geronimo. Several days later, they returned unsuccessful in their mission. Crook, replying to a telegram from United States Marshal, Z. L. Tidball, who requested the General's opinion on the final disposition of three prisoners recently taken from San Carlos to the Tucson jail for their part in the Cibecu affair, strongly suggested that the military and Agent Tiffany incited the situation. If the settlers desired a general war, then prosecute the Indians; for "Where all are implicated, the singling out of a few for trial will impress the Indians as an unjust and cruel discrimination, especially when the uncertainty of the testimony upon which you have to depend for conviction is taken into consideration." 8

Failing to make contact with the renegade Chiricahuas, the party returned to San Carlos. Bourke described issue day where "a great crowd of bucks, squaws and pappooses, mounted and on foot, dressed in accordance with the dictates of latest Apache fashion, or scarcely dressed at all, surged towards the place whence supplies were to be dealt out," the children "gazing in speechless wonder at the uncouth and white-faced strangers." The women brought with them conical baskets which they proceeded to fill with rations. Later, burdened with children and goods, they "looked at us from under their tangled manes of coal black hair with glances almost as furtive and gypsylike as those of the youngsters." Bourke observed that at one time they might well have been handsome women, but "exposure, drudgery and the cares of maternity" worked their unpleasant course.9

Bourke remained for some time at San Carlos interviewing Apaches on various aspects of their culture. Among the first items of information imparted to him concerned the "sweat-house" and marriage. The former was important for its curative powers as well as a means of ablation. The sweathouse was no more than a hemispherical hut constructed of willow twigs. In front of the hut were placed heated rocks. This particular type of stone was necessary so as “not to fly apart like limestone.” The hut was made air tight by a covering of blankets and buckskins.

The patient encloses himself within and the attendants carry inside, upon two long branches, the stones brought almost to a white heat. A couple of buckets of cold water will do the rest and raise enough steam to scald to death anybody but an American Indian. The victim stands the punishment until perspiration streams from every pore and then rushes frantically for the cooling stream, upon whose bank the lodge has been constructed.10

8 Ibid., October 8, 1882, p. 3249.
9 Ibid., October 13, 1882, pp. 3260-3261.
10 Ibid., October 16, 1882, p. 3279.
Severiano informed Bourke that the Apaches had clans. Those eligible to marry did so outside of their clan. Tribal practice decreed that widows married their brothers-in-law were the latter to so desire, for, “to marry anyone else is looked upon in much the same light as clandestine marriages are among us, the brother-in-law feeling that he has been defrauded out of his right to the dead man’s property which . . . he helped to accumulate.” Upon marriage, wives became a member of their husband’s clan. If the husband died, and the brother-in-law failed to claim his rights, the widow returned to her people with her children’s property.11

Bourke then questioned Eskiminzin, who, during the middle of October, returned his band to the reservation. The subject was the matter of idols in the Apache religion. He replied that his people did not possess any “because God did not want them to . . . know anything about this.” God may have taught the Americans “a name by which to call Him . . . but He left the Apaches to wander about like coyotes and never taught him anything and how could they call upon Him for anything when they didn’t even know what name to call Him by?” Apaches believed in the power of the sun, for they could see that he looked at everything. They thus asked this deity to “grant them long life and years spent according to his will.” Bourke observed Eskiminzin to be most reverent when addressing the sun or Osten. As to a belief in an afterlife, “good Apaches have another world to expect when they die; bad Apaches are stuck in the ground and that’s the last of them.”12

During the latter part of October, Apache scout Mickey Free explained to Bourke several of his people’s marriage customs. According to Mickey, the Apaches practiced polygamy. Apache men, if they so desired, could marry as many as five wives. Where possible, a man desiring more than one wife married his first wife’s sisters; otherwise he espoused “women from her clan who are all looked upon as her relations.” This rule tended to be violated at times. At the death of a husband, “his surviving brothers, in the order of seniority, have prior claims to the widow’s hand; next to them, but scarcely inferior in right, come the clansmen who are looked upon as the dead man’s brothers.” If the widow remained unclaimed, custom permitted her to freely “bestow her affections upon anybody.” But should she “marry in defiance of the brother’s vested rights” convention required the new husband to pay the brother or the clan “a sum of money, rifles, cartridges, blankets or some recompense of that kind.” If the woman died, the widower’s only consolation was to vie for the affection of one or more of the deceased’s sisters—had he not done so already. “The young lady waits a reasonable time to be asked, and if the brother-in-law has failed to express any desire to marry her, she has a right to demand what his intentions are; and then, if he repudiates her . . . she has the right to accept any man who asks for her, without any restriction except such as the rule of exogamy imposes.”13

11 Ibid., October 19, 1882, pp. 3287–3288.
12 Ibid., pp. 3388–3339.
13 Ibid., October 29, 1882, Volume 64, pp. 9–11.
Early in November, Bourke made another inspection tour of the region with General Crook. With Bourke were Severiano and Alchise. While on the trail, Bourke learned something of the treatment accorded a prostitute. Though she might marry and conduct her life in an upright manner, there was “always . . . found some one of her own sex to cast her past record in her teeth.” If she bore “a child, she will often try to destroy it; if it live, it is frequently addressed by a term of reproach, signifying whose child are you? Who is your father?”

Bourke’s informants soon thereafter provided additional material about death customs and marriage practices. At the death of an Apache, the immediate family “abandon themselves to a paroxysm of grief.” Their hair was shorn and they shattered to pieces all that they possessed: implements, animals, and crops. The house of the departed was “always given to the flames.” Burial arrangements were “placed in the hands of the old women who wash the corpse carefully, dress it in the best raimant and carry it to the place of sepulture, singing: ‘he was a man, now he is gone, he was the best of his race, but now his name shall never be heard again.’” Burke said this alluded to the distaste which the Apache exhibited for referring to the names of the dead in any manner. The Apaches interred the corpse in a “suitable crevice in the rocks, within convenient distance” of their village.\(^\text{14}\)

Severiano and Alchise informed Bourke that the Apaches purchased their wives. There was no wedding feast. The prospective groom courted the parents of his intended rather than the girl herself. Upon his return from the hunt, he presented a deer or turkey to the mother or father “as a mark of respect and a proof of his ability to support a wife in good style.” The period of courtship generally lasted a year before the man received the parents’ permission to marry their daughter. “They will then begin to say either in the presence of the young man or that of his friends: if one is so fond of our daughter why don’t he make an offer for her and buy her?” Strenuous bargaining then commenced, “one side enhancing the bride’s merits, the other extolling the value of goods offered until a compromise is effected and the sale agreed upon.” If the groom entertained second thoughts about the virtue of his bride, custom permitted him to send his betrothed back to her parents and demand the return of that which he paid for her. The forsakened’s father would then immediately tie her wrists to a tree and keep “her there without food or drink until she divulge the name of her betrayer, from whom they can demand a compensation equal to the value of goods previously paid by the man who wished to marry her.”\(^\text{15}\)

Early in January, 1883, while at Whipple Barracks, Bourke took notice of a so-called Indian outrage with regard to the deaths of Al George and Charles Mehan. This was, however, just another attempt on the part of Arizona’s territorial press to incite an all

\(^\text{14}\) Ibid., November 5 and 6, 1882, pp. 67 and 70.

\(^\text{15}\) Ibid., November 6, 1882, pp. 71–72.
Captain John Gregory Bourke, circa 1883
Photograph courtesy of the Sharlot Hall Museum, Prescott, Arizona
out Indian war for their own greedy ends, such endeavors not being infrequent. After all, land was needed for an ever growing cattle industry and ore had to be extracted. The military investigated the incident and reported that “not a single sign of an Apache was to be found and that no cattle had been killed or stolen.” Bourke surmised that the men in question met their end “by cowboys or by their own companions in a drunken quarrel over a mining claim.”

Bourke later moved to Fort Bowie to assist in the preparations for the assault in the field against Geronimo’s renegade band. While there, Bourke recorded a conference that General Crook held with several Apaches recently captured in Mexico. According to Pahnayotishn, the Chiracahua[s] broke from the reservation because of the ill treatment given them by Agent Tiffany. Some of those who left apparently did so unwillingly. One night, sixty Chiricahuas confronted Pahnayotishn. “They said: “Get up and come along. You are one of us. You have two wives from our people and your little child is a Chiricahua; you’ve always lived with us and now you must come with us.”” Left with no choice in the matter, Pahnayotishn departed the reservation with the hope of escaping from the renegades at the first opportunity.

Soon after this conference, General Crook, accompanied by Bourke, spent the first half of April conferring with his Mexican counterparts on the matter of a full scale pursuit of hostiles into the Sierra Madre Mountains by American troops. Despite a recent convention which strictly limited the incursions against the hostiles on either side of the border by troops of both nations, an understanding was reached by all concerned which permitted Crook’s forces to penetrate deeply into Mexico, provided the Mexican government raised no serious objections. On April twenty-third, General Crook moved out, and on the twenty-seventh and eighth held two conferences with his Apache scouts. Crook, Bourke said, explained that until the Chiricahua problem was satisfactorily settled, the San Carlos Apaches would be unable to live at peace. The General urged the scouts to consider the circumstances and lend their full cooperation to the endeavor at hand. Bourke said the scouts not only understood, but were most eager to “clean up this whole Chiricahua business, in order that peace and contentment might be made certain.”

By May, Crook’s expedition crossed the Mexican-American border. Almost immediately, they encountered signs of the renegade Chiricahuas. All the while, whether on the trail or in camp, Bourke continued to record his observations of the Apaches. Several days into Mexico, Bourke noted that “one might readily fancy himself in Arcadia, there are so many flutes sounding in the wickiups. The Apaches have been making them all afternoon from the cane growing up in such plenty. They call these four-holed flutes tzul.” Amidst this din, a medicine man, in full voice, worked

16 Tombstone Epitaph (Tombstone, Arizona), January 3, 1883.
17 BD, January 22, 1883, Volume 66, p. 32.
18 Ibid., April 7, 1883, Volume 68, pp. 23–25.
19 Ibid., April 27 and 28, 1883, Volume 69, pp. 63–64, and 72.
his ministrations over a youngster with a sprained ankle. Though
the medicine man succeeded in putting the boy to sleep, Bourke
wished he could obtain a “bottleful of . . . liniment to supplement
his incantations.” When Bourke visited the scouts’ camp, several
told him he ought to belong to the Kyachanin or Destrchin clan. In
reply, Bourke diplomatically said he “was a member and brother
of each clan, a rejoinder which tickled them greatly.”

By May eighth, Burke saw numerous traces of evidence left
by the hostiles as he traversed rugged mountainous terrain. On the
tenth, Crook again conferred with the scouts. Were the Chirica-
huas to offer resistance and not submit, the scouts said “they would
kill the last one; and if they did submit, they thought that some of
the bad ones, like Juh and Geronimo ought to be put to death any-
how, as they would be all the time raising trouble.” General Crook
said that if the hostiles wanted to fight, “they should have all the
fighting they wanted and the scouts couldn’t kill too many to suit
him, but he wanted them to save women and children and grant
mercy to all who asked for it. We should take prisoners back to
San Carlos and there teach them to behave themselves.” That night
the scouts held a medicine dance. The medicine man predicted that
the hostiles would be found in two days at which engagement many
would be killed.

By mid May, Crook’s forces located the hostiles. On the
twentieth, after several days of engagements with the military,
Geronimo made his first appearance to the General to open negotia-
tions. Meanwhile, Bourke lamented that he “should have been at a
loss for some new item to be inserted in my journal, had it not been
for the kindness of Captain Crawford and Lieut. Gatewood who
put me on the scent for fresh data of importance.” Captain Emmet
Crawford called Bourke’s attention to the existence of Apache
medicine shirts. Through the good offices of Alchise, Bourke
located one of these and noted that Apache warriors wore these
“only in time of actual conflict” as a means to effect success in
combat. Lieutenant Charles Gatewood described for Bourke a cere-
monly involving the blessing of a war-bonnet. The medicine man
carried the treasured headgear about and placed it upon the heads
of the warriors, while at the same time sprinkling them with hod-
dintin or sacred meal. Later Alchise permitted Bourke to examine
his medicine sash. The Indian believed this item to be a “sure guar-
antee against arrows and bullets: in fact, against all dangers.”
On May twenty-fourth, Geronimo agreed to gather his people and
return to San Carlos, though some time would elapse before this
was accomplished. Satisfied with his achievement, General Crook,
after the first of June, began the return march to Arizona, arriving
there on the eleventh. Once again the General succeeded in restor-
ing peace to this territory.

Yet Crook’s problems did not end there; for soon San Carlos

20 Ibid., May 2 and 3, 1883, pp. 84-85 and 93.
21 Ibid., May 10, 1883, Volume 70, pp. 30-31 and 33.
22 Ibid., May 21 and 23, 1883, pp. 78 and 88.
Agent P. P. Wilcox chafed against the restraints imposed upon him by a July, 1883, agreement between the Interior and War Departments which permitted Crook to maintain police control over the Apaches on the reservations. Wilcox accused Captain Crawford, whom Crook placed in command of the police, with exceeding his authority and interfering with the agent's duties.  

On May 4, 1884, General Crook, accompanied by Captain Bourke, arrived at San Carlos to investigate the situation and confer with the Apaches. Between investigation and conferences, Bourke continued his observations of the Apaches. From Antonio Besias, Bourke learned that “Apache widows cut their hair off short and dress poorly; they use no paints, do not cut off fingers, or slash their legs,” nor did they put ashes on their head. The Apaches, Bourke said, “have an ill defined belief in the Doctrine of Transmigration. Some of them think that, after death, they may turn into coyotes, bears, or animals of some kind, but most of them think they are to enact the role of unquiet ghosts, and flit about at night infesting the scene of their abode on earth, until” laid to rest with ceremonies and offerings. Owls were a most unpropitious omen. “Their hooting at night would scare the bravest of the Apaches; it was considered to mean . . . ‘thou art going to die.’” Even so, on occasion, the Apaches employed owl feathers for decoration.

With the exception of a tizwin drunk inspired by Kayatenna and his restless followers during June, the remainder of the year saw a great degree of tranquility. Crook continued his periginations about the reservations conferring with the Indians, and Bourke continued with his studies of the Apaches. According to Bourke, Sanchez, an Apache clan leader, desired to defer his conference with Crook until the General arrived at Fort Apache. Sanchez hoped to induce Crook to turn over three women held in the post stockade on a charge of witchcraft. He “intended to put them to death just as soon as they fell into his hands, believing that they had caused all the sickness afflicting his band.” The Apache Bagotzin did see the General and said a witch “sent him word that all his children should die. Three had already died. When all had died, he also was to die. He felt himself getting sick now.” At this, Sanchez stepped in and insisted there were witches at Fort Apache. Indeed, one who “professed to be a witch, boasted of her power and said that she could dig up the bodies of the dead and take the brains, tongue, saliva, heart, blood, hair and nails, rub them up with pounded rattlesnake and wreak deadly havoc. The Apaches, he said, made it a rule to tie such witches by the wrists until they surrendered their deadly medicines” after which the sick then began to get well. Crook, Bourke said, attempted without success to dissuade the Apaches from this belief. Sanchez emphatically insisted that their “old men knew all about this thing; for his part, he attributed the loss of the crops on the Carrizo this year to their

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23 Arizona Daily Citizen (Tucson, Arizona), March 29, 1884.

24 BD, May 5, 1884, Volume 76, pp. 27 and 34.

25 Ibid., May 7, 1884, p. 47.

26 Kayatenna, dissatisfied with reservation regulations, was later arrested and sent to Alcatraz.
malign influence." 27 Despite their superstitions, Bourke, upon leaving the Apache reservations that October, observed these Indians to be in a better mental and physical condition than they had been in twelve years. The Apaches appeared well fed and dressed, and "industrious, ambitious, [and] anxious to work, to learn, and to improve." Rather than indulge in tiswin, they demanded plows and desired an education for their children.28

By December, Bourke was once again at Whipple Barracks busily engaged in his soldierly routine. During March, 1885, Crook detailed Bourke to make an inspection of departmental posts. While Bourke was on tour, restlessness again descended upon the Apache reservations. The newly inaugurated Cleveland administration replaced P. P. Wilcox with C. D. Ford, an agent of the Tiffany stripe. Soon thereafter, the military and the civilian branches of the government renewed their squabble over the management of the Apaches—with all too disquieting results for Arizona. The Apaches sensed this divisiveness, bided their time, and, on Sunday, May 18, 1885, Geronimo and his followers bolted from the reservation.29 Three days prior to Geronimo's last outbreak, Bourke submitted his report, requested a transfer to his regiment in Texas, and soon departed Arizona. Learning of the affair, Bourke offered Crook his services in the field.30

By mid October, Bourke reported for duty at Fort Bowie. While at this post, Bourke repeatedly heard reports of depredations supposedly perpetrated by Apaches upon, among others, Arizona cattle growers. Bourke again wondered whether such deeds were so arranged as to make these Indians look guilty. The Captain had his suspicions confirmed when, in early November, several cattlemen explained to General Crook "that many of the outrages and raids charged to hostile Indians were really the work of 'rustlers' disguised as" Apaches. This caused Bourke to muse that the Apaches "are not by any means the worst class of inhabitants in Arizona." 31

Besides keeping a close watch on developments in the field, Bourke spent much of November comparing observations with Al Sieber, chief of the Apache scouts. One of the more intriguing topics discussed was the "influence wielded upon the tribe by Apache women." They had absolute management of all dances, transmitted descent, and influenced political discussions. Because Apache males could not be "hewers of wood and drawers of water," their women perfomed much difficult labor. After all, the men were either on the hunt, on the war path, or, when at home, on guard against the enemy. Thus, "being until lately without beasts of burden, the Apaches had to make their women the carriers of the tribe, except when they could capture slaves." At

27 BD, October, 9, 1884, Volume 77, pp. 93-94.
28 Ibid., October 19, 1884, Volume 78, p. 38.
30 BD, May 20, 1885, Volume 79, p. 87.
31 Ibid., November 3, 1885, Volume 81, p. 32.
this, Bourke reflected that slavery "must have been a necessity to the comfort, if not to the existence of primitive races. Men might wish to eat them, but the keen sagacity and self interest of women saved them that they might be compelled to labor for the tribal prosperity." Al Sieber, Bourke said, "thought that simply because an Apache at rare intervals beat his wife, no case was made ... against his affection for her, or her influence with him. White men beat their wives, but they do it secretly, whereas all of an Indian's life is known to the world—he has no privacy. Until he begins to erect brush fences to keep the wind and dust out of his hut, everything was open to the searching eyes of his neighbors.32

During the middle of December, while conducting his researches in the field, Bourke, accompanied by Al Sieber, Moses Henderson, and Fatlagoltzii, searched for an Apache medicine cave near San Carlos, but the endeavor did not prove fruitful. Returning from the supposed site, the party happened upon a Sacred Stone Head. At this, "Moses dismounted, picked up a stone and a handful of grass, and rubbed his breast, abdomen, arms and legs" with this, all the while uttering a prayer: "'Be good to me stone pile, be good, long let me live ... do good to me, ... Upon the earth let me walk. Be good to me stone pile ... keep my limbs sound and strong.'" Moses then "put down the grass, covered it with the rock, spat, and stepped back smartly." This, Bourke said, was a pure and simple case of stone worship.33 Finished with his field trip, Bourke departed San Carlos for Fort Bowie on December nineteenth.

Soon thereafter, during January 1886, seven Apache captives were brought in. One of these, Francesca, provided Bourke with a number of interesting and useful pieces of information relating to Apache customs. Among these was her version of Apache marriage practices. Elderly relatives of the lover arranged the marriage. The events which led up to a particular union began with a visit by the relative to the intended's parents. Francesca said the parents "always feign astonishment, had no idea of letting their girl marry ... and finally express a fear that the young Irian may beat the girl after he has married her. The mother says that she loves her daughter tenderly ... and has doubts of the aspirant's ability to provide for her in the style she has been brought up." Eventually, the parents' initial objections were overcome. The suitor, of course, paid a handsome price for the bride. Once these preliminaries were taken care of, the girl's mother "builds a house by the appointed time, and the girl is ready, arrayed in her best toggery, her hair neatly cleaned and her face freshly painted. The night the house is finished, they wed," a dance and feast having already been given by rich Apaches on the evening the groom tendered his presents to his prospective father-in-law. Were difficulties encountered in the marriage, the parties easily obtained divorce by mutual con-

32 Ibid., November 8, 1885, p. 55.
33 Ibid., December 12, 1885, Volume 82, pp. 151-152.
sent. If a husband beat his bride, the “mother comes and says: ‘Here are your presents back,’ and takes away her daughter.”  

Francesca also told Bourke of the Apache Fire Myth. “Once the Sun’s son became sick and was almost dead. No remedy seemed to help him. At last said the Sun, ‘gather all the people together: make a big fire—dance around it; put him near it.’” Before this, Bourke noted, the people did not have fire.

“They did as the Sun directed. There were many people, Indians, singing and dancing. The coyote took some cedar-bark, rubbed it up fine, made it into a roll, and tied it to his tail, under the hair. He began to dance with the others, poking his tail towards the fire. ‘Look out! You’ll burn your tail,’ they said. ‘Oh! No! I won’t,’ said he. He kept on dancing and soon the roll of cedar-bark caught fire and away scampered the coyote across the country, setting fire to grass and everything else. Everybody pursued him. The flies, which were then all the same as Indians, came the closest to him. Some caught up with him and some didn’t. Some got little specks of fire from him. You can see them yet of warm evenings dancing in the air. But the coyote escaped to the mountains, on which he kindled a conflagration in a forest to which man couldn’t reach. There was a Great Crow, whose body was very black, but whose head was very red. He was bigger than all the other crows. He said to man: ‘I’ll help you get fire,’ so he flew up to the top of the mountain, found the roll of burning cedar-bark, which the coyote had dropped and brought it down and gave it to man.”  

Francesca explained to Bourke that her grandfather recited this legend while sitting with her one night by the fire.  

Bourke also visited the camp of the Apache scouts located at Fort Bowie. On one occasion he observed a “‘medicine hat’ decked with eagle feathers and with the usual . . . invariable symbols of the elements, lightning, cloud, winds, rain and a ‘Black Sun.’” The Black Sun aroused Bourke’s curiosity, for he found this “so much more reverenced and feared than the other!” Bourke speculated that the Apaches, not understanding a solar eclipse, believed the sun might not return. He concluded the Apaches “would have more fear and, consequently, more respect and reverence for a Sun which possessed the power to leave them than they would for one fixed unalterably in its course.”  

By March, Bourke decided he had accumulated more material than could properly be analyzed and interpreted by one individual in a life time. On March twenty-first, therefore, Bourke applied “to be relieved from special duty in connection with [the] Indians

34 Ibid., January 3, 1886, pp. 189-190.
35 Ibid., February 8, 1886, Volume 83, p. 112.
36 Ibid., February 18, 1886, pp. 141-142.
in Arizona.” Even so, prior to his departure, Bourke took advantage of the opportunity to once again accompany General Crook into Mexico for the purpose of forcing Geronimo’s surrender. Earlier reports indicated that the Chiricahua renegades were in a state of disarray and that an imminent capitulation could be expected by the end of the month.

With the arrival of the once incorrigible Kayatennae from his incarceration at Alcatraz Island on March twenty-second, Crook was able to make final preparations for the journey into Mexico. The military did their work well as reports indicated that Geronimo was ready to sue for peace. General Crook hoped his expedition would effect the Chiricahua’s surrender. Bourke and Crook took the field the next day. Two days later, on March twenty-fifth, Crook had his first conference with Geronimo. The Chiricahua said he broke from the reservation because he feared the consequences of the desultory remarks made about him. The Apache warrior desired a fresh beginning. “From here on, I want to live at peace. Don’t believe any bad talk you hear about me. The agent and the interpreters hear that somebody has done wrong and they blame it all on me. Don’t believe what they say. I don’t want any of this bad talk in the future.’” Geronimo said he believed himself a good man, “but in the papers all over the world, they are saying I am a bad man, but it is a bad thing to say about me: I never do wrong without a cause.’” Crook, however, was not quite convinced and set Kayatennae at work to cause division within the ranks of the hostiles in order to completely demoralize them. The tactic worked, and on March twenty-seventh, the Chiricahuas surrendered. On the twenty-eighth, they were to march for Fort Bowie.37

But alas! Demon rum was shortly to interfere. Though indeed most of the Apaches consummated their agreement with Crook, the real prize once again escaped. Bourke felt a deep bitterness over the whole affair. As March twenty-eighth dawned, Alchise and Kayatennae rushed to Crook and informed him of the general state of inebriation among a number of the renegades. “Whiskey has been sold them by a rascal named Tribollet. These Indians asked permission to take a few of their soldiers and guard Tribollet and his men to keep them from selling any more of this soul-destroying stuff to the Chiricahuas. A lovely commentary upon American civilization!” Bourke was soon accosted in a maudlin manner by a drunken Geronimo. Bourke said “this incident so alarmed and disgusted me and was so pregnant with significance that I rode up to General Crook and asked to have Tribollet killed as a foe to human society and, said I, ‘if you do not do it General Crook, it’ll be the biggest mistake of your life.’” Crook felt all he could do was to order an investigation. But the mischief, Bourke said, was already done. By this time, Bourke fulminated vehemently. “This is the curse of our stupid military system; our army, when in campaign, should carry martial law with it as an atmosphere, as by no other means could prompt and commensurate

37 Ibid., March 25, 26, and 27, 1886, Volume 84, pp. 112–150.
punishment be inflicted upon such hell-begotten scoundrels.” With Geronimo went thirty-three warriors and forty-eight women and children.\textsuperscript{38}

Bourke and Crook returned to Fort Bowie on March twenty-ninth. In a heated argument with General Sheridan over the manner in which the Chiricahua surrender had been handled, Crook requested to be relieved of the command of the Department of Arizona. As for Bourke, Crook ordered him to accompany the remains of Captain Emmet Crawford—a gallant soldier killed that February in an engagement with the hostile Apaches. On April 1, 1886, Captain John Gregory Bourke, entraining for Nebraska, left Apacheria for the last time.

Unmindful of the exterminationist sentiment of the hour, John Gregory Bourke used his intellectual powers to good advantage while serving on the Apache frontier. His interest, openness, and objectivity unlocked the doors to a large storehouse of knowledge about the vanishing life style of the Apaches of Arizona—doors which otherwise would have remained closed to a less sympathetic observer. Bourke evinced concern about and involved himself with the Apaches on a truly human scale. There might be instances of depredating on their part, but in many cases, so far as Bourke was concerned, the Apache was more sinned against by covetous settlers than sinning. Such an attitude earned for Bourke the Apaches’ confidence, esteem, and respect, which enabled him to provide the ethnological world with a sizeable body of information concerning numerous aspects of the Apache culture. Rising, therefore, above his role solely as a military officer, John Gregory Bourke was one American who made a serious attempt to understand—achieving no mean degree of success in the endeavor—the Indian and his way of life.

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\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., March 28, 1886, pp. 147–150.
Peace did not descend on Mexico like a dove when the Insurrectos chased dictator Porfirio Diaz from Mexico. Instead, too many hawks and buzzards tried to divide the spoils of the new ineffectual administration. The Madero Government made blunders and produced no agrarian reforms as promised. President Madero proved weak and indecisive, and the real power rested in his brother's hands. Soon Mexico suffered from a regime as corrupt and expensive as Diaz' but without the stability of the former dictator's government. Dissenters and opportunists aggravated the situation as they went their own ways.

Disillusioned with Madero, Emiliano Zapata broke with the government and resumed his burning of haciendas and the killing of property owners in southern Mexico. General Bernardo Reyes, who had lost the election to Madero by the overwhelming margin of ninety-eight percent, tried to redeem his political fortunes. He moved to Texas, but within a month he returned to Mexico to launch a counter-revolution against Madero. Reyes wandered aimlessly for a few days after failing to attract supporters before the government moved in and arrested him. In the fall of 1912 Felix Diaz led a barracks revolt against Madero at Vera Cruz that lasted only a few hours and ended with Diaz' imprisonment. The discontent existed throughout Mexico, but the most serious troubles were in northern Mexico.

In the state of Chihuahua a disgruntled General Pascual Orozco pronounced that Madero had to go. The General had been the central military figure of the 1911 revolution that brought Madero to power. Orozco felt he deserved the appointment as Minister of War in Madero's Cabinet; instead, he received the relatively unimportant position of military commander of Chihuahua. Early in 1912 Orozco demanded Madero's resignation. Madero countered in February by declaring Orozco to be against the government which caused the General to organize a rebellion in March. This caused Pancho Villa to break with Orozco, his old leader. Villa initiated some scale fighting against Orozco forces in Chihuahua, but at this time Villa was not much of a threat. Orozco's rebels moved against Juarez making it the only border city directly affected by this revolt. When the rebels threatened Juarez, it worried the United States. President William H. Taft privately told advisors, "You know I am not going to cross the line... But I suppose it will do no harm to threaten them a little."

Taft then told both Mexican factions not to fire into the U.S. or else. The Madero Government took Taft's bluff so seriously that they evacuated Juarez, fearing that stray bullets might bring armed intervention by the United States. Therefore, the rebels took the city early in 1912, but within a month the Federales reoccupied it without incident. Madero sent General Salas north with an army
to destroy Orozco. When Salas failed, Indian General Victoriano Huerta took over the campaign. Huerta tore up the rebels in several battles and within five months had scattered the rebels. Orozco fled into the U.S. while many of his followers took refuge in the mountains of Sonora. Madero then retired General Huerta when the General could not account for over a million pesos lost from the campaign expenses.

Still Madero's troubles continued and in February, 1913, Felix Diaz and Bernardo Reyes became part of an attempted coup d'etat in Mexico City involving the Capitol garrison. In desperation Madero recalled General Huerta and placed him in command of the palace troops. Instead of putting down the revolt, Huerta made a deal with Diaz and then engaged in a bloody but sham battle for a week with the sole intent of weakening Madero further. Then Huerta closed his trap and arrested and jailed President Madero and Vice President Pino Suarez; and on February 22, 1913, Huerta had both of them murdered. Huerta then assumed the presidency and, in essence, imposed a conservative counter-revolution upon Mexico.

Opposition to Huerta came swiftly. Shocked by Huerta's bloody methods, the United States refused to recognize his government and pressured other governments to do the same. In Mexico, Pablo Gonzales, Pancho Villa, Alvaro Obregon and Venustiano Carranza came out in overt opposition. Villa quickly won a series of victories in Chihuahua, while Obregon and his Yaquis struggled to take full control of Sonora. Carranza, the Governor of Coahuila and more a theorist than a military man, tried to assume the leadership of all the forces opposing Huerta. He drew up a plan as a charter for a Constitutionalist movement, but the other factions were not attracted to his standard. Carranza then suffered several military reverses in Coahuila which illustrated his poor military leadership. With his revolt going nowhere in his home state, Carranza, traveled to Sonora hoping to lead the more successful revolutionary movement already in progress there.

By February, 1913, Sonora figured as the key state in the rebellion against Huerta. After the fighting in Agua Prieta during April and May of 1911 (revolt against Porfirio Diaz) things had remained quiet in Sonora until the summer of 1912 when the fleeing rebels from Orozco's revolt moved in from Chihuahua. The state forces could not contain the invaders or the indigenous "red flag" movement that became active about the same time. These rebels pillaged the Mormon colonies at Oaxaca and Morelos and the mining camps of Tigre, Cananea and Nacozari. These irregular forces requisitioned their supplies at gunpoint and did whatsoever pleased them.

The situation in Sonora degenerated to such a point by August of 1912 that the U.S. Government insisted that the Mexican Government station sufficient forces at the mining camps and Mormon colonies to protect American lives and property. The minimum number of soldiers demanded was set at 5,000 and the U.S. granted
permission to move the Mexican troops across United States soil. Mexico accepted the offer but moved only 1,000 men from Juarez to Agua Prieta by way of American soil. This was the first time Mexican soldiers moved in American railroad cars across U.S. soil. Most of the troops stayed at Agua Prieta, with only fifteen being dispatched to the Mormon colonies and 300 to 400 for all the mining camps. However, the rebel’s plundering continued unabated forcing the mining companies to reduce their operations, while most of the Mormons moved into the United States.

Among the Mormon exiles was Bishop C. W. Lillywhite of Colonia Morelos. He charged the Mexican Government had not provided the protection they had promised four months earlier. He stated that living conditions and agricultural production were impossible due to the wholesale stealing and plundering. The Comisario of Agua Prieta, T. Elias Calles, denied Lillywhite’s accusations and stated that there were enough troops in the area to protect lives and property. Calles maintained that there had been no losses due to stealing and plundering. Lillywhite and Calles engaged in a wordy battle in the Douglas newspaper for a week in January, 1913; the former cited specific losses, the latter issued denials and claimed that Sonoran regular forces had everything under control.¹

Calles’ optimism did not agree with the situation assessment of General Pedro Ojeda, commander of the Agua Prieta garrison. At the very same time of the Lillywhite-Calles discussions two rebel leaders surrendered. Federico Cordova and Rafael Servalles had petitioned Mexico City for amnesty in return for surrendering. With the granting of their request, the two leaders and seventy-five of their men surrendered to General Ojeda in mid-January of 1913. Cordova stated the reason for his abandonment of the rebel cause as being due to growing tired of being branded a bandit and being linked to a movement espousing patriotic talk of liberty and justice which was nothing more than a cloak to cover up rebel looting and destruction. General Ojeda expressed the view that the surrender of these rebels, although gratifying to the Federales, did not go far in eliminating rebel trouble in Sonora. Ojeda maintained that only those areas where Federal garrisons were stationed would experience anything akin to law and order.²

The situation in Sonora became worse and more complex with the death of President Madero, and Huerta’s seizing of power in late February of 1913. Sonora took the lead in opposing Huerta as state Governor Jose Maytorena ordered his state troops not to follow orders from the new government. Sonora’s policy of nonrecognition of Huerta sparked a clash in Agua Prieta between the military and civil authorities. General Ojeda, commander of the Federal garrison, accepted Huerta while Comisario Elias Calles tried to follow the Sonoran state policy. On February 22, 1913, Calles with state troops clashed with Ojeda’s Federales. The Fed-

² Dispatch, January 21, 1913.
erales quickly routed the state troops and Calles fled into the United States. He claimed he ran to prevent being hanged for not recognizing Huerta.

General Ojeda controlled Agua Prieta but with some difficulty as on February 26th sixty of his men deserted and joined the Sonoran forces in their revolt against the new Federal Government; and the rebels controlled most of the countryside around the city. The rebels had the superior numbers, but this advantage was offset by the diversity among their ranks. Some were Red Flaggers, others Maderistas, or Carranza’s Constitutionalists, and some were Sonoran state troops following orders, while a few were just bandits taking advantage of chaotic conditions. Sometimes the various bands united in a common cause, more often they went their own ways.3

The renewed fighting in Mexico caused the United States to send reinforcements to the border. In Douglas, Arizona, the American soldiers had been encamped in temporary quarters at the ballpark for more than two years. In late February of 1913 a detachment of the 9th U.S. Cavalry stationed themselves near the quarantine slaughterhouse east of Douglas, and serious thought was given to setting up a more permanent army camp since the Mexican Revolution appeared to be of long duration. Camp Douglas began to take shape soon thereafter. The same thoughts were true for the garrison stationed at Nogales, Arizona, where what came to be called Camp Little took a more permanent shape. The U.S. Army’s considerations of abandoning Fort Huachuca which had been receiving serious consideration for several years were dropped for the time being.4

The military situation immediately south of the border saw General Ojeda in command at Agua Prieta with 500 soldiers. Ojeda also had troops under his jurisdiction throughout northern Sonora, including Colonel Francisco I. Escandron at Naco with fifty Federales, and Colonel Emilio Kosterlitzky defending Nogales with 200 to 300 men. The opposing rebels possessed more men and controlled the rural areas as they moved their forces about the countryside via horseback and more and more by railroad. With one side dominating the cities and towns and the other the rural areas, the mastery of Sonora could only be accomplished by battle. Both sides expected to fight as did civilians on both sides of the border. The only questions were when and where the two forces would meet to fight it out.5

Agua Prieta seemed the prime place for the encounter, but the rebels resisted an attack, apparently figuring it was too strongly held. So Agua Prieta received only scares from the rebels while the only shooting occurred between the Federales and U.S. troops. On March 2, 1913, Lieutenant Nicholson with three men of the

3 Bisbee Daily Review (Bisbee, Arizona), February 23, 1913. Hereafter cited as the Review.
4 Dispatch, February 15, 1913; March 5, 1913.
General Pedro Ojeda flanked by two Americans in a photograph taken shortly after Ojeda fled into the U.S. from Naco, Sonora, on April 13, 1913. The portly general with the bushy mustache was one of the best Mexican officers in the revolution.
U.S. 9th Cavalry were patrolling the border near the Calumet and Arizona Smelter west of Douglas when they were fired upon by Mexican troops from across the border. The Americans returned the fire until sixty more Mexicans arrived, then the four U.S. soldiers took refuge in the smelter and called for reinforcements.

Shortly the American reinforcements arrived with a machine gun which they fired at the Mexican soldiers who beat a hasty retreat out of range. The United States filed a complaint with General Ojeda over the incident. Ojeda initially tried to blame the shooting on Maderistas who had somehow got that close to Agua Prieta. When this was discounted, Ojeda claimed the Americans shot at Mexican troops enroute to Naco. The U.S. denied this charge. In any event the afternoon shooting drew an audience. One of the local newspapers wrote:

Many Americans were on the nearby road in autos when the fight was going on, and the railroad tracks and every vantage point was crowded with people with glasses to get a glimpse of the affray.

Two days later a detachment of Mexican troops fired on the U.S. troops stationed near the quarantine slaughterhouse east of Douglas. After the first shots the Mexicans deployed into a skirmish line facing the border. The American soldiers readied a machine gun and shot a couple of bursts at the Mexicans who quickly withdrew. Again the United States protested this violation of American soil, and this time Ojeda claimed his men had fired at a strange man on horseback who had failed to halt when challenged. The U.S. troops and two U.S. law enforcement officers present denied seeing the man on horseback and insisted the shots came directly into the U.S. The bizarre shooting incidents defy a rational explanation since they did not help the Federales who needed to maintain a friendly open door to the north in case they needed supplies or an escape to safety.

The big scare for Agua Prieta came after the rebels attacked Naco and took the town. A few of the defending Federal troops escaped and fled north to join Ojeda. The flight of these soldiers northward caused civilians along the way to flee towards the border. Large numbers of refugees moved into Agua Prieta and then into the U.S. All expected Agua Prieta to be attacked next, and reports circulated of some 800 rebels advancing toward the border town. So Douglas, Arizona, experienced the “second exodus from Agua Prieta” which was of greater magnitude than the one two years earlier. This time more Mexican civilians sought the safety of American soil due to their experience in the first battle of Agua Prieta. A local newspaper, whether exaggerated or not, wrote:

Practically all the citizens of Agua Prieta have moved

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6 Review, March 4, 1913.
7 Ibid.
8 Dispatch, March 5, 1913.
9 Dispatch, March 9, 1913.
across the line into Douglas in expectation that the Maderistas will attack the town.\textsuperscript{10}

Although the rebels did not attack Agua Prieta they caused the Federal garrison to leave. The rebels moved in and besieged Nogales, Sonora, defended by Colonel Kosterlitzky. General Ojeda abandoned the defense of Agua Prieta in an attempt to relieve Kosterlitzky. Ojeda left Agua Prieta on March 12, 1913, and that night Elias Calles and 450 Sonoran state troops rode into town via a freight train. Calles found about thirty Federales who had been left by Ojeda hopefully to control the city and collect all moneys from the custom house. All but six of the Federales went over to the rebels, the remaining six were unceremoniously run out of town. Only eighteen days earlier Calles had fled Agua Prieta, now he controlled the town.

The happy rebels celebrated their victory with a parade highlighted with numerous rebel flags and cries of “Viva Madero.” Calles sent word to the Mexican refugees in nearby Arizona that they could safely recross the border; the returnees gave rise to another round of celebrations. However, Calles kept a fairly tight lid on the celebrating to ensure they did not get out of control and become disruptive, for he had promised the American authorities that no civil disorders would be allowed in Agua Prieta. Apparently earlier disorders had infringed upon American soil in one way or another.\textsuperscript{11}

In Nogales Colonel Kosterlitzky assessed his situation before the rebels staged their siege. He telegraphed his immediate superior General Ojeda a week before the rebel attack and reported that all signs indicated Nogales to be the rebels’ next major target. When Ojeda took no immediate steps to reinforce Nogales, Kosterlitzky sent another telegram stating that General Obregon had gathered 800 rebels to move on Nogales. Ojeda felt his commander exaggerated greatly and cautioned the colonel to pay no attention to rumors and if attacked to hold on for General Ojeda and some 3,000 troops were coming to his relief. Two days later, March 11, Ojeda wired Kosterlitzky that he was leaving at once, but unfortunately for the Federales Ojeda did not get away on the 11th. That night the rebels burned several railroad bridges on the line to Cananea and cut the telegraph wires to Agua Prieta. Ojeda left Agua Prieta the next day and moved west along the border but stopped at Naco since he was unable to use the railroad due to the burned bridges.\textsuperscript{12}

In the meantime Kosterlitzky’s force prepared for battle and hoped that Ojeda would get there in time. They dug trenches around the town and Kosterlitzky positioned his men in the trenches. As the Federales got ready, so did many Mexican civilians. Many Mexicans fled across the border into the United States. The

\textsuperscript{10} Review, March 11, 1913.
\textsuperscript{12} Review, March 11, 12, 1913. Dispatch, March 11, 12, 13, 1913.
Mexican National Bank moved its cash and papers to American soil, and many merchants transported their merchandise across the border. The initial American activity occurred when the American Consul traveled by automobile to the rebel camp outside Nogales and warned the rebels not to shoot into the United States.13

With the rebels moving in and surrounding Nogales on all of its Mexican sides, General Obregon demanded the unconditional surrender of the town on March 12th, but Kosterlitzky refused to parley insisting he was ready for any attack. Kosterlitzky also vowed he would face extermination before he would flee into the U.S. When Obregon repeated his call for surrender, Kosterlitzky replied: “My men are ready and will resist with the utmost defense. I stand on my military honor.” While the two opposing forces of Mexicans made demands and statements, Captain Cornelius C. Smith readied the American forces he commanded. He stationed most of the troops of the 5th U.S. Cavalry along the border inside Nogales, Arizona, with only a few men left to patrol the border on both sides of the city.14

The battle for Nogales began about 1:30 a.m. on March 13th and for three hours it consisted only of the rebels making random shots at the town. At 4:30 a.m. the rebels attacked from the south with rifles and grenades. The frontal assault turned out to be mostly show and noise for the rebel strategy was to flank the city parallel to the border and thereby keep down the possibility of shooting into the U.S. The flanking movement in the dark morning hours failed in part because one of the flanking parties swept too far north and crossed into the United States where they were temporarily interned by the American troops. With the light of dawn the two sides could see one another and revealed the flanking movement, and that the rebels had also dug trenches to protect their advances. Two more morning assaults by the rebels failed to dislodge the Federales. In the afternoon three trains brought supplies and reinforcements for the rebels allowing Obregon to greatly strengthen the rebels’ offensive thrust. Shortly the rebels made a massive assault with concentrated fire on the Federal trench which resulted in stray bullets falling on the U.S. side of the border leaving several civilians wounded and many buildings marked with bullet holes.15

Then a bullet struck an American soldier, wounding him seriously. Lt. Colonel Tate of the 5th U.S. Cavalry had had enough. He sent word to General Obregon to cease firing or “I will be after you.” Tate also warned the Federales to immediately suspend shooting. Kosterlitzky protested this demand, but in view of his situation and believing the rebels would continue the battle and advance during the night, Kosterlitzky decided to evacuate Nogales, Sonora. At 5 p.m. he mustered his men near the custom

14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
Ojeda's breastworks consisting of railroad ties and earth protected the Federal barracks at Naco, Sonora.
house and retreated into the United States where he surrendered to Captain Smith.\footnote{Ibid.}

In less than fifteen hours of fighting the rebels occupied the town. They immediately sent thirty-two of their wounded over to Nogales, Arizona, for medical care in the same hospital where the Federales also were being treated. The Americans held the enlisted Federales who had surrendered in a camp near the U.S. military encampment while Kosterlitzky, other officers and non-commissioned officers remained at liberty on their word of honor. Kosterlitzky at this time wrote his report of the fight claiming he had only four men killed, seven wounded and twenty captured by the rebels. He asserted that the rebels “should have taken about 150 deaths.” Kosterlitzky’s casualty figures were too low for his losses and too high for his opponents.\footnote{Ibid.}

The scene of action quickly shifted to Naco, Sonora, where General Ojeda had stopped his men enroute to relieve Nogales. If Ojeda felt restricted at Agua Prieta, his new position was even more precarious as the rebels now held Agua Prieta to his east, Nogales to his west, and controlled more of the countryside to the south. On March 14, 1913, when he learned of Nogales’ surrender, Ojeda prepared to make his stand inside Naco. He ordered his men to dig trenches, position his three machine guns and prepare for a long siege. During this time of preparation American newspaper reporters interviewed Ojeda, and he vowed he would neither surrender to the rebels nor accept “white feathers,” the latter expression given in contempt for Kosterlitzky’s Nogales retreat into the United States.\footnote{Review, March 14, 15, 1913.}

When rumors circulated about rebel forces advancing on Naco, several automobiles loaded with Bisbeeites drove into Naco, Sonora, to see for themselves the possibility of a fight. They talked to Ojeda, surveyed the town, and even drove a short distance in the direction from which they surmised the rebels would come. While many Americans moved closer to the expected excitement, the Mexican civilians, for the most part, saw the developments as dangerous and many crossed into the United States. Some of them moved just across the border, but others, including some residents of Naco, Arizona, moved away from the border area. The small detachment of the 9th Cavalry assigned to the area from Fort Huachuca received reinforcements from the fort.\footnote{Ibid.}

On March 14th Elias Calles left Agua Prieta with some 400 men; four hours later Prefecto Bracamonte followed with another 350. The two rebel forces moved to within three miles of Naco and camped. They outnumbered Ojeda’s force more than two to one, still they waited for more reinforcements. However, Ojeda did not wait; instead, he left Naco’s defenses and attacked. He completely surprised the rebels in their camp on March 15th and thoroughly
routed them. Ojeda captured thirty-four prisoners and a lot of arms and supplies, then returned to Naco. Ojeda ordered the captured rebels shot at sunrise.

The next day, Sunday, at least two of the prisoners were executed, but of the recorded deaths only one came by gunshot. The other one suffered strangulation by a handkerchief wrapped around his throat in which a bayonet was placed and twisted until the victim expired. The following day the Federales executed at least seventeen more captive rebels. This action by Ojeda did not endear him to the rebels or the neighboring Americans who viewed him as a barbarian.20

The rebel setback at Naco magnified the several problems they were experiencing. Their soldiers were either Sonoran state troops or recent recruits who had followed Calles and Bracamonte to Naco. They lacked discipline for when Ojeda surprised them they just ran, with most of them returning all the way to Agua Prieta before they could be regrouped. Then rebels raised the resentment of the normally sympathetic Americans along the border. The evening of the day that the rebels were routed, a group of them crossed into the U.S. either by mistake or otherwise. They ran into an American party which they pinned down with gunfire for half an hour before returning to Mexico. In this affray a Deputy U.S. Marshal received a bullet wound in the leg. Other rebel problems included the loss of arms, ammunition and other supplies when Ojeda routed the rebels outside of Naco. Last of all desertion took its toll of rebel soldiers. Although no figures are available, the indications are that especially when the rebels engaged in long sieges, their numbers dropped as their men slipped away to return home.21

However, desertions plagued Ojeda even more than the rebels. A large portion of his Federales were Yaqui Indians. On the night of March 17th ninety Yaqui men and twenty-five women and children left Ojeda and crossed into the U.S. and surrendered to the American authorities. Two days later the Yaqui deserters who had crossed the border totalled 216, a sizeable chunk of Ojeda’s command. The Yaqui action came as a surprise of some magnitude since it came right after the Federal victory over the rebels and before Naco was besieged. Why did they leave? Well, immediately after their victory over the rebels the Yaquis supposedly built a sacrificial altar then sent two of their braves to Ojeda to get one of the captured rebels. They told Ojeda they wished to offer up the heart of the prisoner in order that they might be assured future victories. When General Ojeda refused the proposal, the Indians saw it as a bad omen and deserted the Federales.22

20 Review, March 16, 17, 1913. Dispatch, March 15, 16, 18, 1913. Manuel Sandomingo in his Historia de Agua Prieta wrote that General Ojeda committed several atrocities in Naco that blushed the face of the matron that guards the sacred face of history.


22 Review, March 18, 20, 1913. Dispatch, April 11, 1913.
Ojeda's problems mounted as the Sonoran troops under Calles and Bracamonte regrouped and returned to the Naco area and camped east of town, but further away than the last time. Ojeda then asked the Southern Pacific Railroad for a train to move his men to the relative safety of Hermosillo. Two weeks earlier the railroad had suspended all traffic between Nogales, Cananea and Naco, and had moved almost all of its rolling stock into the United States due to the unstable conditions in Mexico. Therefore, the railroad refused Ojeda's request for a train, and Ojeda could not commandeering one. Just when Ojeda received the railroad's refusal four Bisbeeites and one Douglasite ventured into Naco to observe conditions and a very upset General had them summarily arrested and jailed. Fortunately for the Americans, Ojeda released them within an hour. Ojeda then impressed into his service a number of wagons, and it appeared that he would try to leave Naco. So American reporters rushed over to interview Ojeda who had been very accommodating to newspapermen since his arrival in Naco, but now he curtly refused to tell the reporters anything. Ojeda's touchiness caused the reporters to return quickly to American soil.

On March 22 General Obregon approached Naco with some 1,000 men, including Yaqui chieftain Luis Bule and his Indians. They camped four miles southwest of town, and Obregon sent a note to Ojeda demanding the surrender of Naco. When Ojeda refused, the rebels surrounded Naco on its three Mexican sides and settled down to besiege the town. Suddenly the pressure on Naco disappeared as most if not all the rebels moved south to engage the Federal garrison at Cananea. Ojeda reacted by leaving Naco's defenses on March 26th and moved south hoping to strike the rebels from the rear. He got within fourteen miles of Cananea when he learned it had already fallen. He quickly turned north and after fighting a light skirmish with a small band of rebels, he returned to Naco at 8:30 p.m. on March 28th.

The next day Ojeda's men improved their defenses as they threw up breastworks of railroad ties and dirt outside their barracks. Later the same day the rebels returned and encircled Naco, Sonora from border to border. The various rebel groups were led by the likes of Calles, Bracamonte, Cabral, Alvarado, Chief Luis Bule, and Obregon; for one of the few times they agreed, as all acknowledged Obregon as their spokesman and leader. General Obregon hesitated in launching an attack on Naco hoping a siege would suffice, thereby preventing stray bullets from going into the United States. The recent Nogales affair was too fresh on his mind to be shaken off without some consideration. If Kosterlitzky had not immediately surrendered at Nogales the American commander's warning to Obregon to stop shooting into the U.S. or "I will be after you," would have been tested to see if it was more than bluff.

23 Review, March 18, 20, 1913.
25 Review, March 30, 1913.
With Obregon’s caution the siege of Naco continued into April. The siege was not a thirty-day continuous classical siege as so often portrayed, but more of an intermittent one, more off than on at the first. However, in April the rebels clamped the siege on to stay but with little shooting. The struggle changed abruptly at 5:40 a.m. on April 8th when a terrific explosion racked the area. The rebels had grown tired of waiting and to initiate their first charge they hurled a railroad car loaded with dynamite at Naco hoping the blast would disorganize the Federales.

The blast failed in its purpose because Ojeda had removed a rail from the railroad track and the explosion occurred short of its target causing little damage. Nevertheless, the early explosion signaled the rebels to launch their long delayed assault. The Federales beat back the attack after two hours of heavy fighting. However, Yaqui rebels closed and held a position less than a mile west of the town. In the afternoon the rebels made a second assault that again failed to take the town.\(^{26}\)

When the shooting began the United States had six troops of the 9th U.S. Cavalry at Naco, Arizona, under Colonel Guilfoyle. During the first assault three American soldiers received gunshot wounds. Although bullets fell “thickly” in Arizona, luckily no other injuries were inflicted. Colonel Guilfoyle reacted by warning both Mexican forces about shooting into the U.S., but to no avail as the shooting continued and many bullets fell on the north side of the border. Shortly eight rebels were captured on the American side. They were equipped with hand grenades and had hoped to surprise the Federales by hitting them from the unguarded American side. The arrested rebels were interned for the American military and civilian authorities were highly upset about this direct daylight violation of U.S. soil.\(^{27}\)

During the battle the Mexican wounded, when and where possible, were taken to the United States for medical care. While a few Mexican civilians fled into the U.S. to join many of their comrades who had left before the shooting began. This flow of Mexicans from the war zone into an area of relative safety contrasted sharply with the flow of spectators from north to south. With the outbreak of the shooting no less than twenty-one automobile loads of curious people from Bisbee, Douglas, and other points in nearby southern Arizona headed for Naco—leaving a peace zone trying to get at least close to the war zone. American authorities stopped the spectators north of Naco, Arizona, in a depression near the railroad tracks. While here the spectators received several showers of bullets from across the border, still they “fretted” about not being allowed to enter Naco, Arizona, where they hoped to get a better view of the battle. The “Purdy Pass grandstand” held many spectators during the next four days.\(^{28}\)

The shooting went on into the night of the first day, but in the morning of the following day the Yaqui rebels backed off and the

\(^{26}\) Dispatch, April 8, 1913.
\(^{27}\) Dispatch, April 8, 9, 1913.
shooting slackened. So on April 9th General Ojeda set his troops to
digging trenches 500 yards west of town and next to the Interna-
tional Line. In improving his defenses, Ojeda hoped to prevent the
rebels from getting as close as the Yaquis had the day before. As
the Federales dug their trenches, an American observer stepped
across the border to inspect the work and to his surprise two Fed-
erales seized him and started to march him away. On the U.S.
side a black soldier, unarmed and off duty, observed the situation
and quickly crossed the border and disarmed the Mexicans and
brought the two Federales and the American back into the United
States. A Negro sergeant came up and asked the off duty soldier
what he thought he was doing. The soldier answered: “Well, sir, I
just noticed things weren’t going right and thought I’d stop that
foolishness.” The sergeant promptly returned the Mexicans’ rifles
and they stepped back into Mexico.29

The shooting resumed and again bullets fell on the American
side of the border, so Colonel Guilfoyle sent Obregon a note to
cease firing into the U.S. Obregon had a dilemma, if he complied
with the request it would restrict his advance and firing to a nar-
row sector parallel to the border so all shooting would be either
due east or west. This would make his task of taking Naco
extremely difficult, if not impossible; still, he did not wish to offend
the Americans with more shooting into the United States. Guil-
foyle appeared extremely serious for when the bullets continued to
rain on U.S. soil, he ordered his men to return the fire. The follow-
ing day the U.S. troops in Arizona received a directive from Wash-
ington, D.C., ordering no shooting into Mexico under any circum-
stances. This high level American decision probably prevented a
nasty situation from becoming much worse. In the meantime Obre-
gon promised the U.S. authorities that he would notify them when
he was going to attack, and he would stop all shooting that could
enter the U.S. as soon as the military situation would allow it.30

Obregon notified Colonel Guilfoyle that the next assault would
be early April 12th. The rebels had not been able to crack Ojeda’s
defenses, the trenches and wooden breastworks being a match for
the superior number of rebels. So the rebels loaded a railroad
gondola car with six boxes of dynamite and early on the 12th
they hurled it on the downgrade approach to Naco with such speed
that it cleared the space where Ojeda had removed the rail so that
it traveled all the way into town. But the dynamite failed to
explode, and to make matters worse the Federales unloaded the
dynamite and used it to make hand grenades. Since the signal for
the general attack was the expected blast, the attack fizzled.31

Now Obregon informed the Americans that a large attack
could be expected Sunday, April 13th. Early Sunday morning a
rebel hand grenade brigade slipped into town (from north or

28 Dispatch, April 9, 1913.
29 Dispatch, April 10, 1913.
30 Dispatch, April 10, 11, 1913.
31 Dispatch, April 11, 12, 1913.
This photograph of Naco, Sonora, was taken about three weeks after the April 13, 1913 battle, and shows the effects of the fire.
south?) and at 3:00 a.m. they began throwing bombs at the Federal barracks and other buildings, setting fire to Naco. The first explosions signaled the general assault which quickly drove in the Federales' outposts on the east and west ends of town. An hour later Naco, Sonora, was fully ablaze and bullets were flying in every direction including into the U.S. However, within two hours and after the attack on the barracks ended, Obregon's promise came true as thereafter few bullets strayed into the U.S. The rebel strategy of hitting hard from both the inside and outside worked remarkably well for it so disorganized the defenders that they put up little resistance.\textsuperscript{32}

About 6:00 a.m. General Ojeda and a small group of Federales moved into the Mexican custom house only twenty feet from the U.S. border. When it became apparent that the rebels could not be repulsed, Ojeda came out of the building and waved his hands at the American authorities, then dashed across the border and surrendered to U.S. troops about 10:45 a.m. After Ojeda accepted his "white feathers" he gladly posed for many photographs and appeared relieved to have made it to safety. He had sent his personal effects across the border the night before. A "few hours" after Ojeda's departure the remaining Federales in the custom house set fire to the building and ran into the United States.\textsuperscript{33}

Within minutes 300 to 400 Yaqui rebels came up along the border to the main crossing point between the two Nacos. The shooting stopped completely and after ten minutes or so the "Blue Cross" workers in the United States believed it to be safe to cross into Mexico. The volunteers included Dr. F. W. Randall with two Mexican helpers taking a livery bus as an ambulance, an automobile with Dr. J. J. P. Armstrong, another car with three Americans, four newspapermen, and finally an El Paso moving picture man, his assistant with two Americans in another car.

The fifteen volunteers had several motives for crossing the border into Mexico, some to treat the wounded, others to get news stories, and others to make a film. The fifteen stopped at the border and fraternized with the Yaquis under Chief Bule. Suddenly thirteen Federales popped up and dashed for the U.S. border running and dodging through the midst of the surprised Yaquis and Americans. Eleven of the fleeing men made it safely into the United States, while the Yaquis shot and killed two of the fleeing Federales.\textsuperscript{34}

The day's surprises were not over, for shortly there came sounds of yelling and shooting when a second group of Federales numbering about 100 made a mad dash for the American border. They came from the barracks area and had to move a greater distance in which to be discovered and shot at. The Yaquis near the border opened fire on the Federales as did the Sonoran state

\textsuperscript{32} Dispatch, April 15, 1913.

\textsuperscript{33} Dispatch, April 15, 1913.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
troops. General Obregon and Chief Bule were on the scene, but only Obregon moved quickly to stop his men from shooting. It took some personal persuading on the part of the Americans to get Chief Bule to stop his men from firing. Most of the Federales made it into the United States.\textsuperscript{35}

The Sunday battle ending the long siege of Naco lasted some eight hours and it came two years to the day from the date when Red Lopez took Agua Prieta. As usual, especially when fights lasted some time, many spectators gathered on the American side of the border. Some came early and took up all the available lodging in Naco, Arizona, and stayed until the action came. They were newspaper reporters, film makers and a few who were just determined to not miss any battle that may come off. But most of the spectators came the day of the battle and had to be content with remaining on the outskirts of town. Some 150 sightseers came to the border by train while many more came down by automobile; the newspapers described the Naco-Bisbee road as "black with vehicles."

The only reported casualty among the spectators came when a bullet hit an American in the arm. After the battle the sightseers were allowed to enter Naco, Arizona. Then the spectators made a move to cross into Mexico to see the effects of the battle and fire from close view, but the American troops quickly sealed off the border which highly upset many of the sightseers.\textsuperscript{36}

The rebels or Constitutionalists, as they were beginning to be called, immediately moved against the Chinese in Naco. They took the foreigners’ provisions and secured several forced “loans” which the Chinese called stealing. Within days most of the Chinese in Naco and nearby northern Mexico fled into the United States finding the anti-foreigner feeling of the revolution too great to try and live with. Amid the smoking rubble and ruin of this small Sonoran town the rebels celebrated their victory and the eviction of the hated Chinese with more gusto and enthusiasm than they exhibited after taking Nogales or Agua Prieta. Possibly the explanation for this extra jubilation lies in the fact that the struggle had taken so long and was more difficult than the other two victories.\textsuperscript{37}

The number of Federal officers and soldiers who surrendered to U.S. forces numbered 270. Ojeda and his officers were paroled, while the enlisted men were kept under guard. Eventually all the Federales were released. American volunteers manned a temporary hospital in Naco, Arizona, to care for the wounded from both sides. The day after the battle eighty-six Mexican soldiers—only fifteen to twenty being rebels—remained confined in the hospital.

Some Mexican women sympathetic to the rebel cause visited the hospital and taunted the wounded Federales for not putting up a real fight and for turning tail and running into the U.S.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Dispatch, April 15, 16, 1913.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
against their previous declarations. The crowning insult came when the women offered to trade their skirts for the trousers of the Federales, for in the pre-women liberation era the offer-insult was carried with great impact. The American newspapers came down hard on General Ojeda calling him a "coward" and teasing him for not committing hari kiri which the news media claimed he promised rather than surrender to the rebels or the Americans.  

Nevertheless, the facts show that General Ojeda and his command did far more with a lot less men and material than any of the other Federal garrisons along the border. They had twice daringly left their defenses to make thrusts into territory controlled by a superior number of rebels. Inside Naco they had set up a good defensive structure that withstood the rebels' superior numbers (at least a five to one advantage) for a much longer period than even the American observers expected. The portly gent with the mustache was the best Federal general or officer stationed along the border during this period of the Mexican Revolution.

The Naco struggle was one of the few battles where fairly accurate casualty figures were given for both combatants. However, as usual the civilian losses received no mention. In the month-long siege the Federales suffered 130 killed with sixty-seven wounded, and the rebels had 150 killed with 185 wounded. During the Battle of Naco on April 13th the Federales had twenty-nine killed, fifty-six wounded and thirty-three captured. The rebels suffered twelve killed and fifty-four wounded. Compared with previous battles this struggle between the two Mexican factions ranked as a bloody affair.

The rebel success in Sonora greatly assisted the movement against Huerta. It not only gave the rebels control of much territory to the embarrassment of the Federal Government, but helped in financing the revolution as well. The rebels opened the port of Agua Prieta on March 20, 1913, and the first day's receipts totalled 2,000 pesos. As the news spread about the reopening of the border, the receipts climbed. The Sonoran state government expected to receive an average of $200,000 in gold per month from the three Sonoran ports of Agua Prieta, Naco and Nogales. This source of revenue proved essential to the rebel cause and successes.

The Sonoran troops proved themselves the best disciplined and most effective of the rebel armies, and their officers, notably General Obregon, were good. By the summer of 1913 they had driven the Federal troops from all of Sonora except the seaport of Guaymas, and soon they marched south into Sinaloa, chasing the armies of Huerta. Shortly after the state declared against Huerta, Governor Jose Maytorena asked the state for a leave of absence and moved into the United States. Roberto Pesquiera became the provisional governor of Sonora until Maytorena decided to return sometime later. With Maytorena gone, Sonora had no immediate

38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Dispatch, March 21, 1913.
candidate for national leadership since Obregon and Calles were still only local figures. So in April of 1913 the Sonora Legislature recognized Venustiano Carranza's self-assumed title—First Chief of the Constitutionalists.

The following September Carranza left his home state of Coahuila where the rebels were faring poorly and moved to Nogales, Sonora. Here he organized a government and proceeded to direct the revolution as much as the various rebel military leaders would let him. Nogales became, for a short time, the gathering place of the intellectuals, idealists, reformers, and the seekers of power. They as well as Carranza enjoyed the protection of the Sonora state forces. After the fall of Naco the military activities of the rebels swung away from the border leaving territory to be governed by the rebel politicians in Sonora.

In the neighboring state of Chihuahua, Pancho Villa led the anti-Huerta forces. He had escaped from a Mexico City prison and made his way into the United States. At midnight on March 13, 1913, Villa and eight comrades swam their horses across the Rio Grande to fight against Huerta. Villa easily recruited an army and during the spring and summer defeated Huerta's Federales in a series of pitched battles which earned Villa his reputation. Soon Villa controlled all of Chihuahua except the cities where the large Federal garrisons were stationed. In the autumn Villa took a leaf from Red Lopez' book, loaded his men on a train, and steamed into Juarez and captured the prized border city. The Villistas then moved against the other cities and finally took Chihuahua City, which Villa made for himself what Carranza had made Nogales. Then in early 1914 Villa started his drive south.

With General Obregon and General Villa's large armies moving southward, chewing up Federal garrisons on the way, and Zapata's army tearing up southern Mexico, and President Woodrow Wilson of the U.S. engaged in a diplomatic duel with Huerta, the dictator's days of power were numbered. On July 14, 1914, Huerta resigned and fled Mexico and by August 10th the Federal garrison in Mexico City wanted to surrender, but to whom—Obregon or Villa? Villa's drive toward the Mexican capital was halted by political dealings and the cutting of his coal supply thereby he could not operate his trains. Carranza had stopped Villa feeling the military chieftain a threat to Carranza's plan to control Mexico.

Thus, on August 15th while Villa fumed, Obregon took control of Mexico City and Carranza assumed he would continue as "First Chief," only now officially. The various rebel bands had united to some degree to overthrow the dictatorship of Huerta, but each of the leaders was self-serving enough to ensure that the problem of who would run Mexico was not answered. As soon as it became apparent that Huerta was doomed, a giant power struggle ensued among the revolution leaders to determine who would truly be the first chief.
Marie Harr Leitch was one of the old timers in Cochise County. She was one of the early day school teachers and the first postmaster at Elfrida.

Marie Harr was born in Kaufman County, Texas, August 21, 1892.

She attended high school in Monteague County, near Bowie, Texas, and received her college training in Austin, Texas.

In 1911 she came to Arizona with her parents when they homesteaded near Apache.

Marie taught school in a one room building in the San Simon Valley until she married Richard Alfred Leitch in June, 1913.

Three children were born of this union—Dorothy, now living in Washington, D. C., Roberta, now living in Pasadena, California, and Joseph now living on the home place near Elfrida, Arizona.

In 1914 Mr. Leitch started and ran the first store in Elfrida, and in 1915 Marie became the first postmaster when mail service began in the area.

In 1918 the Leitches bought farm property about 3/4 of a mile north of Elfrida and bordering on the road which later became Highway 66. Thereafter Marie regarded this property as home, although it was not possible for her to constantly remain on it because of the demands of rearing and educating a family.

While the children were still small it became necessary for Marie to assume the full burden of this task.

In 1925 she went to San Diego State College to renew her teacher's certificate. In 1926 she taught school at Azusa, California, but Arizona was home, and in 1927 she returned and taught school at Webb, an area now known only as the name of a voting district.

In 1928 she taught school at Whitewater, a district now incorporated in the Elfrida school. She continued teaching at Whitewater until 1935.

At the age of 61 she returned to college at Arizona State University at Tempe, where she received her B. A. degree in elementary education.

She taught at Buena School in Sierra Vista from 1955 to 1963, when she retired and returned to the place near Elfrida which had been considered home for so many years.

Here she remodeled the house, set out fruit and nut trees, flowers, and shrubs—plants of all kinds grew for Marie, for she loved them all.
During the years Marie taught school away from home, she maintained her voting registration at Elfrida and always returned to cast her vote in the Webb District.

She enjoyed her well earned retirement to the fullest for ten years and passed away at her home in July, 1973.

All who knew Marie loved and respected her. She was versed in so many subjects and always willing to share her knowledge with others.

She was truly one of our pioneers who left a heritage to be proud of.